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Recognition of new property interests 
In this chapter, \ve ,,,,ill consider the essentially dynalnic qualjty of property. \Vhile 
it is iInportant that the categories of property are clear and certai 11, it does not 
follow ti'0111 this that the list should be eternally fixed and incapable of develop-
Inent. As you \vill see, there is constant pressure to recognise new property 
interests, although l for reasons \ve shall eXcllninc, it is not easy for an interest to 
cross the threshold into property. Ho\vever, the history of property be,us ,,,it ness to 
the constant expansion of the range of property interests in response to society's 
changing needs and increasing e0l11plexity. 
In section 9.1 \ve ,viII consider the reasons ,,,hy the property label is (and is 
not) attached to certain interests. \t\!hile in section 9.2, \\Te shall illustrate the 
dynanlic nature of property by eX11111ining exanlples of interests that have (at 
least intennittently!) been accorded proprietary status. \"r e ,,,ill contrast th is, in 
section 9.3 \vhere \ve consider the la,,"s general reluctance to elllbrace ne\\' 
property interests, \vith an exanlple that did not even fleetingly cross the 
property threshold. This ,viII enable llS to exalnine the principles which under-
score the recognition of ne\-\' property interests before subjecting thenl to a 
critical evaluntion, in section 9.4, ,vhen \ve consider a c0l11parati\'c and eCOIHlIllic 
stud" ,vhich casts doubt on l11lleh that has gone hefore. Finallv, in section 9.:; \\'e 
, ~
\vill turn to speculate on possible ne\\' directions in ,vhich the lcn\r of property 
nlight develop. 
9.1. Why are certain interests regarded as property? 
In order to cOJlsider why the property label is attached to certain interests \ve need 
briefly to consider the abstract fUllction of property, the reasoll \\'hy it is onl~' 
adopted as a 11leaSllre of last resort and tinally the requircI11ents that 11111St first he 
satisfied bet()re any interest ean be ;l(corded proprietary status. 
9.1 .1 . The function of property 
The property label basically perfornls three related functions which we will hrietl~' 
consider here although thev are co\"ered in IllllCh ~reater det<lil in Part I. 
'- . ~ 
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9.1.1.1. As a Ineans of allocating scarce resources 
There \vould be no need to have property rights in a world of infinite resources. For 
\-"hat would be the point in distinguishing yours frolll 1l1ine (or theirs frool ours) if 
there \-vere no litnitations on \vhat \·vas available. For it ,,,,ould not I11atter ho,,,, 1l1uch 
your neighbour took as ther<~ would always be nlore than enough left for YOll to 
take (and as 11111Ch as you \vanted without, in turn, causing an)' problenls for those 
who Gl1l1C along afterwards). Property rights are in effect a response to scarcity 
\vhere it beC0111CS inlportant to delllarcate rules governing the use of tIllite 
resources, for othenvise there will be endless disputes and conflicts in respect of 
how the particular resource should be exploited. 
9.1.1.2. As an incentive to prOlllote their Inanagenlent 
The property label also provides an incentive that tends to pr01110te the 
nlore productive lnanagelnent of such resources. There is little point in your (or 
our) cultivating a field if its harvest can be reaped by another. Sin1ilarly (although 
not the satne - can you say ,"vhy?), ,,,,hat \vould the point be in the Sony Corporation, 
for exatnple, expending tinle and effort (and therefore Dloney) in developing a new 
invention if there \-vas no 111eanS of preventing others usurping their design or 
process (but not sinlply the idea - see section 9.5.2 below)? The institution of 
property enables rules to be established that prevent such takings and so provide an 
econoJ11ic incentive to\-vards better husbandry of both existing and ne,,, resources. 
9.1.1.3. As a moral, philosophical or political statement 
Property is one of the Ineans by \vhich l11oral, philosophical and political percep-
tions are given tangible expression. It does not (for these purposes at least) 11111Ch 
lHatter \vhat general justification \ve offer as to \-vh}' the fanl1er in the field should 
(or for that 111atter should not) reap the benefits of the harvest. For ,-vhether your 
argl1l11ent is founded on Nlarxisll1 or libertarianis111, utilitarianis111 or natural 
justice, attaching the property label is the first stage in the process. Yet this is 
1110re problenlatic than it at first appears \vhen it (OIlleS to specific justifications 
concerning \vhat sort of things should be considered property. vVhile disagree-
Inents over ,-vho should reap the harvest \vill probably all proceed on the aSSUll1p-
tion that the harvest is a suitable ob.iect in \vhich property rights (of SOlne kind) 
111ight vest, the satne would not be true, for eXi.1111ple, of a 11l1l11i.111 kidney. For the 
debate there \vould centre not on ,vho should o\vn but about ,,,,hether anyone 
should be capable of oWlling such ,1 thing. 
9.1.2. The danger of property 
Property rights arc dangerous things. For, unlike contractual rights, they have the 
power to bind third parties \vho are not party to the legitiInate processes by ,vhich 
interest holders acquire their interest. Thus if YOll purchase a stolen car fron1 a 
thief, YOll will nonna11)' be bound by the interest of the person frolll ,"VhOl1l the car 
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was stolen. For as long as they renlain o,vner their dainl \vill bind third parties such 
as )'ou despite your lack of knowledge concerning the car's provenance. You \\'Oldd 
consequently have no defence to an action in conversion brought by the legitilllate 
o\vner and \voldd have to Illake do ,,,,ith a personal clainl against the (often 
disappeared) thief. Sinlilarly, if you as the o\vner of an estate in land grant a legal 
easenlent (see Chapter 8) to tne, 111)' interest \\lill attach to the land and bind 
whosoever purchases the estate fronl you irrespective of ""hether they kne\v about 
this interest burdening their estate (subject to the rules about registration \ve 
consider in Chapter 15). This Inight have very serious consequences for the 
purchaser if nl)' easel11ent is inconlpatible \vith the purpose for \vhich he bought 
the estate in the first place. 
Vve \viJI consider else\vhere the various 111eanS by which these potential dit11-
culties lnight be surnlollnted (see Chapters 14 and 15 belcn'\'). Ho\vever, it is 
necessary here to note that the traditional approach of propert~' la\\' to the problenl 
(both in this jurisdiction and beyond - see Extract 9.2 belo,v) has been to linlit the 
nUlnber of different types of property interest that Inight exist. This is often 
referred to by the shorthand tenn 11l0ner-liS clallsus \vhich, literally translated, 
nleans (finite nlunber', in recognition of the lilnited list of proper!)' interests 
kno\vn to the la\v. Third parties are, in this \vay, protected franl being surprised 
by novel interests that they could not possibly have foreseen. \Ve "'ill consider the 
legitilnacy of this approach in section 9.4 belo\"" but Blust no\v content ourselves 
\vith noting that the courts and legislature h~]ve, in the face of these concerns, taken 
an extrelnely cautiolls approach to the recognition of He\\' property interests. 
Thus a right holder's interest \vill not be accorded the status of a property right if 
the interest can be adequately protected \vithotlt l11aking the interest binding on 
third parties. For eXilll1ple, in Hill v. Tlipper (1863) 2 H&C 121; 159 ER 51 (see 
Extract 5.1 above), the o\vners of a canal entered into a contract \vith I1ill granting 
L. L. 
hinl the (exclusive right' to hire out boats on the canal. [-It)\\'cver, Tupper, a local 
publican, ,·"as allegedly hiring out boats on the saIne stretch of cana), and H il1 
consequently sued hin1 for infringing his lexclusive right' to do so. The court 
unaninl0usly held that Hill's exclusive right to hire \vas silllply a contractual right 
bet\veen hin1 and the o\\~ner of the canal \"hich consequently gave hinl 110 rights 
against third parties such as Tupper. In contrast, the O\\'ller of the canal (\dl0 by 
definition did have a property interest in it) could prevent third parties such as 
Tupper trespassing onto the canal and in t~liling to do so breached his contract \vith 
Hill, \vho could sue hinl accordingly. Thus I-fill's interest could be adeqllatel~' 
protected \vithollt the need to turn the 'right to ply for hire' into a ne\\' property 
interest in land. 
9.1.3. The requirelllents of property 
Before an interest can be accorded proprietary status, it I1lllst fulfil ccrtain condi-
tions. If it lacks certainty, potential transferees of the interest ,viii he reluctant to 
aSSU111e it, as they \viII not kno\-\' what they are getting. i\lnre illlportalltlr, potenti<d 
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transferees of a dU]erCI1I property interest in the sallie thing will be put otT acquiring 
that different interest because they \villnot know ho\v the interest they are acquir-
ing will be affected by the upcertain interest. SilnilarIy, it is often said that a 
property interest in a thing 11111st have a degree of stability and predictability, for 
othenvise it will again put off potential transferees of that and any other propert}' 
interest in the thi ng. (See the discLlssion on j\latiolllli Provi1lcial Ballk v. AinSH'orth 
[1965] AC 1175 in Extract 9.1 belo\\' \vhere \ve consider the argllll1ent that these 
criteria are circular and self-fulfilling - can you see \vh)'?) 
We have so far concentrated 011 problen1s \-vhich \vollid affect future dealings 
with a specific thing \vhich ,,'as subject to an uncertain, unstable or unpredictable 
property interest. However t a 11111Ch 11l0re fundanlental problenl \vould arise if the 
interesc while not necessarily suffering frolll any of these vices, \-vas sin1ply difficult 
for third parties to identify. For then potential transferees \vould not only be put off 
acquiring a specific thing but would have a very real disincentive in acquiring 
anything which 111ight have such an interest attached ('whether or not it in fact did) 
because there \vould be no eas), 111eans of finding out. This, in part, explains the 
la\o\,'s historic reluctance (considered briet1y above) to \VelCOlne novel property 
interests into the fold. Arguably, if the systenl \-vas too ,villing to do so, purchasers 
\yould be 11lore reluctant to acquire interests in things generally as they nlight 
latterly be subjected to other (possibly conflicting) intere~ts that no one kne\v 
existed at the tinle of acquisition but which the courts \vere subsequently \villing to 
hold \vere subsisting at that till1e. 
9.2. The dynamic nature of property 
It is titHe to redress the balance. l'he preceding discussion has described a systenl 
which one lnight be forgiven for assulning \vas static and rigid \vith little prospect 
of change or developlllent. But this is silnpiy not the case for, despite the hnv's 
reluctance to elnbrace He\-\' property interests, the pace of hUlllan developnlent is 
sllch as to 111ake the recognition of ne\\' interests an econol11ic and/or social 
~ 
necessity. Prior to the invention of the printing press, for exanlple, there ,vas little 
incentive in recognising a general property right to copy books. Yet, in the \vake of 
t;uttcnberg's invention coupled \vith (and linked to) the enlergellce of a suffi-
ciently large literate audience, it is hardly surprising that a hnv of copyright 
(literally the right to copy) should soon follo,v. Nor that the pressure to recognise 
a le!!all" enforceable right to cony caine not fr0l11 authors strtH!gling with their ~, I '- t , '-' '-
0111ses but frotH those \-\'ith the technological expertise to benefit frolll sllch a right, 
nalnely, the publishers and printers (see Feather. 'Authors, Publishers and 
Politicians'). 
The history of the con11110n la\\' is littered \vith such instances. As society changes,· 
the notion of \vhat is ~lnd what is not i:l llseable resource capable of being the sub.ject 
of property also changes. For exall1ple, up until the sixteenth century, there is little 
evidence of the tenn property being applied to land under the English COlnn1011 la\v 
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(Seipp, <The (:oncept of Properly in the Earl}' COll11l1011 L,n\,'). 111 1 R2R, \vhen 
C.1. S\van, the Secretary to the Real Property COllllllissioners, invited Benthalll 
to help the Conllnissioll in its deliberations, one of his fIrst tasks was to list those 
things which ""ere not regarded as property and which had not been included in 
Blackstone's \-vork on the subject, such as C0l11pany shares and copyright (SokoL 
(Benthalll and Blackstone on Incorporeal I;ereditanlents'). 
\Ale vvill consider t\VO exan1ples, one priJllariiy eCOIH.Hllic and the other br()adl~· 
social, in \vhich the courts have grappled \vilh the difficulties inherent in sllch an 
endeavou r. vVe \vill begin \\'ith the restrictive covenant before turning to the ,,,ifc's 
(or is it the spouse's?) right of occupation. 
9.2.1. The recognition and lirnits of the covenant as a proprietary interest 
The recognition, in Tlilk v. N[oxlicl), ( 1 R4R) 2 Ph 774, of t he rest rieti Vt' covenant 
(whereby the o,\'ner of land is restricted froJl1 using it in certain ways) as a property 
interest in land sil11ilarly evolved in response to econonlic pressures stclllIl1ing 
fro 111 the industrial revolution and social change in respect of denl0graphic 
upheaval and the breakdo\vn of the feudal structures \vhich had previollsly con-
trolled land use (see Chapter 6 for a 1110re detailed account). Despite the generality 
of sonle of the language elllployed in the case, subsequent decisions did Illuch to 
lilnit the principle, including a requiretllent dnnvn frolll the la\\' of easelnents that 
there 111ust be both a dOll1inant and a servient tenelnent (Londoll C"OIlI1(l' (~ollll(il v. 
Allen (19141 3 KB 642). In other \vords, the benefit of a restrictive covenant Inust 
attach to SOlne land (referred to as the do/"il/ant tel1eJ11Cl1tl and cannot exist in 
gross (i.e. unattached to land), 
In spite of the sOlne\vhat arcane nature of the language enl ployed. the restriction 
can be readily understood if one adopts a practical perspective. A restrictive 
covenant lill1its \-vhat can be done on a piece of land (referred to as the SCITiCl1t 
tellel11Cllt) and \vhile there \vere conlpelling social and econolnic reasons for 
recognising the proprietary status of such a restriction these held only in so l~u 
as the restriction benefited other land. The restrictive COVelli:lnt enabled o\vners of 
land to sell the freehold interest in a portion of their land safe ill the kno\vledge that 
they could ilnpose restrictions on the land disposed of that ,vould survive sub-
sequent changes of ()\vnership and ensure that things \vere not done ,,,ith it which 
,volIld devalue the land retained. This had the effect of freeing up the Inarket in 
land and proilloting alienability even though taken in isobtion the burdened land 
is arguabhr 111ade less attractive b\' subjccti ng it to restrictions in this ,vav. 
\.. ~ • ~ i 
I-hnvever, the balance on ly tilts to\vards a lienabili t y provided there is i.l 
dOlninant tenelnent able to benefit fr01l1 the restriction. If there \vas no such 
requirctnent a restrictive co\'enant Illight have an entirel~c negative effect Oil 
alienability for it ,vould then continue tn IHake the servient tent'lllcllt less attractive 
to potential purchasers ,vithout necessarily prol11oting tht' alienability of other 
land. For \vithout the dOll1inant tenclllent requirelnent there would he no Ileed for 
the seller to retain any land \vith ~lll <lspect that needed pre~l'n·ing. Const'qllcntl~·, as 
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sllch a vendor has 110 econolnic interest in }HHV the sold land is subsequently 
utilised, the courts at the turn of the last centur), chose to provide hinl ,,,,ith no 
proprietary JllCanS of restricting its use. (There are, of course, strong environ-
l11ental arglllnents to the contrary but it would be anachronistic to criticise judges 
froll1 another era for t~li]ing to take account of issues \vhich are, in any case, today 
catered for by other Inechanisll1S - see Chapter 6.) 
It \vollid seenl to follow frol11 such an analysis that the principle of Tlilk v. 
lvloxhn)' \vould be inapplicable to chattels because as lTIoveables they can aI'ways be 
renloved fr<Hl1 a source of interference. But before the principle of a d0111inant and 
servient tenel11ent had been fully established, by cases subsequent to Tlilk v. 
lvloxha)', Knight Bruce LJ in De i\tlottos v. Gibsoll (1859) 4 De G&J 276 at 282 
l1lade the follo,.ving observation: 
Reason and justice seenl to prescribe that, at least as a general rule, where a Jnan by gift or 
purchase, acquires property fronl another with knowledge of a previous contract, 
hl\vfully and for valuable consideration l11ade by hiln with a third person, to use and 
eJnploy the property for a particular purpose in a specified 1l1anner, the acquirer shall 
not, to the InateriaJ dmnage of the third person, in opposition to the contraLt and 
inconsistently with it, llse and enlploy the property in a lnanner not allowable to the 
giver or the seller. This rule, applicable alike in general as I conceive to 11loveable and , 
inl1110veable property, and recognised and adopted, as I apprehend, by the English law, 
l11UY) like other general rules, be liable to exceptions arising fr0l11 special cirClUTIstances, 
but I see at present no rOOlTl for any exception in the instance before us. 
The case concerned an interlocutory application by the hirer ofa ship seeking an 
injunction to prevent both the o,vner and the ship '5 1110rtgagee (\vho, at the tilne he 
acquired his interest, knew of the charterparty under \\'hich the tenllS of hire ''''ere 
fixed) acting in a \vay \",hich \vas inconsistent \vith the charterparty. It is clear, fn)111 
the above extract) that in holding that the 1110rtgagee would be bound Knight Bruce 
LJ \",as dr~l\"ing on the c0111paratively recent case of Tulk v. lVloxllc1)' decided little 
1110re than a decade before. In contrast, the other Judge in the case, Turner LJ, 
seenlS 11l11ch less persuaded, leaving the Inatter open because in his vic\v it deserved 
greater consideration than could be devoted to it at an interlocutory hearing. This 
\vould not appear to have taken place for \vhen it canle to the full hearing it \vas 
held, on appeal by Lord Chehnsford Le, that the charterparty \vas (far too 
uncertain and indefinite' to enforce. Thus the position of the third party 1110rtgagee 
ceased to be an issue \\'ith the Lord Chancellor offering 110 l110re than the oiJiter 
~ 
aside that the 1110rtgagee should (abstain fro1l1 any act \"hich \\'ould have the 
i 111nled iate effect of preventi ng [the (harterparty's J perforInance'. 
Lord ChelInsford cited no authorities in support of his proposition and, in light 
of the introduction of the dOlllinant teneillent requirelnent, 111any judges took the 
vie\.v that (even had it once been so) the principle could no longer be said to apply 
to chattels. Thus, in BHrker v. St ickllcy [1919] I KB l21 at 132, Scrutton LJ stated 
that La purchaser of chattels is not to be bound by IHere notice of stipulations Inade 
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by his vendor unless he \\'as hinlself a party to the contra.ct in ,,,hich the stipulations 
\,\'ere 11lade'. Such dissent \vas neither nc\" nor confined to the higher courts. In 
Taddy v. Stcriolls [ 1 Y04] J eh 354 at 350, (-()(" exalnple. S\\'infen Fad)"' J had already 
stated at first instance that l [c )onditiol1s of this kind do not run with goods and 
cannot be illlposed upon then,' even though l)c Alaltos \'. C;ihsOI1 ,vas seeillingir to 
the point and had been cited to hin1. 
Despite the less than auspicious reception, Knight Bruce LJ's dit"filln \vas 
resurrected by the Privy Council in Lord StnlthL"oll11 Stelll11Ship (;0. v. [)()Jllinioll 
Coal Co. [I926j AC 108 (see Notes and (~uesti()Jls 9.1 beIo\v). The case again 
concerned a charterparty (can YOli begin to speculate ,vhy this 111ight be signifi-
cant?) whereby the l)olninion Coal COlllpany chartered a ship for ten years. 
During that tinle, the o\ovnership of the ship changed hands on a l111l11ber of 
occasions eventually being bought by the Lord Strathcona Steatnship COlllpany 
\-vho obtained the ship on the follo\'Ting terrns: 
The steanler is chartered to the DOlninioll Coal COlllpallY ... (and] the buyers 
undertake to perfonn and accept all responsibilities thereunder as (r0111 date of 
delivery in consideration of which the buyers shall receive froln date of delivery all 
benefits arising fron1 said charter. 
Despite agreeing to these tenns, the Lord Strathcona Stealllship COlllpany 
refused to honour the charterparty. In response, the DOlllillioll Coal Conlpany 
sought a declaration that they ,vere obliged so to do and an injunction restraining 
the ship frolll being used in a \vay that 'vas inconsistent \,7ith the charterparty. The 
judgtnent of the board \vas given by Lord Sha\v \vho. in granting the charterer the 
relief sought, stated that the dicta of Knight Bruce LJ in l)c A4clttOS v. C;ibsol1, 
'not\vithstanding tllClny observations and Jl1uch criticlSJll of it in suhsequent cases, 
is of outstanding authority ... [for) equity ,v(Htld grant an injunction to cOlnpel 
one \vho obtains a conveyance or grant slib cOl7ditiolle frOtH violating the condition 
of his purchase to the pre.judice of the original cpntractor'. 
The case received l11uch adverse COl1lInent, particularl~' fronl I)iplock J in Port 
Lille v. Ben Line Stetl111CrS [1958} 2 KB 146, \vhich \\Te \vilJ deal \\rith belo\v after 
YOll have had a chance to exalnine the pril11ary Inaterials yourself. This ,viII also 
afford us an opportunity to exalnine Lord Shaw's reasoning in the case and a 
possible alternative rationale offered by Bro,vne- \'Vilkinsol1 J in S,,,iss Ball/.: Corp. v. 
Llo)'ds Rank Ltd r 1979] eh 54R. l-lc.)\\,ever. before clllbarki ng 011 this ti.lsk~ and 
\vithollt seeking to preiudge the issues, \"e suggest you consider ",hat relCY~ln(t' tile 
follo\ving \vords of La\\'son and R llddell ( The Lo IF (~r Proper!,}', p. 30) l11ight ha \'e in 
resolving the apparent inconsistencies evidenced by the case kn\': 
Ships are indeed governed hy speciaJ rules of I~l\\' and are for sonlC purposl'S treated 
ahnost as though they were tloating plots of hUHL 
Can you also suggest IHHv stich all approach 1l1ight he consistent with the 
general thesis of this chapter that, despite its reJuctance to do so, thl' law is '\'illitl~ 
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(and able) to recognise ne\v proprietary interests vvhen there are c0l11pelling 
econolnic or social reasons so to do? 
Notes and Questions 9.1 
Consider the fol1<.Hving notes and questions. both before and after reading 
Lord Strathcolla Siellnlship Co. v. OOll1;l1iol1 Coal Co. [ 19261 A(~ 108 and the l11aterials 
highlighted belo\v (either in fuJI or as extracted at W\v\v.canlbridge.org/propertyhnvl). 
""hy do YOll think the Privy Council resurrected the principle of De A/lotios v. 
Gibson ( 1859) 4 De G&J 276, after nlore than haIfa century in \vhich the fatio had 
often held to be inapplicable in respect of other fornls of personalty (e.g. 
/v/cGrlltherv. Pitcher (19041 2 eh 206; Barkerv. Sticklley [1919J 1 KB 12l)? "Vere 
the facts of the case, the particular type of property involved or the nlake-up of the 
court illlpOl1ant factors in the decision? 
2 Can you identify \·vhat interest (if any) the covenantees had in the chartered 
vessel other than their contractual rights under the charter? Do you think the 
charterers had any interest that Inight sensibly be described as proprietary (see 
Port Lill(, v. Bell Lille StCl1111erS [1958] 2 KB 146)? 
, 
3 Does Lord Sha\v's reterence to constructive trusteeship clarify or obscure the issues? 
Does the use of such language require one to identify ,vhat propelty is subject to the 
trust and \vhy it \vould be nonsensical to describe the ship itself in such terlllS (see 
Snllllders v. \!allt;er t 1841) Cr & Ph 240)? \Vhy \vould it be equally ul1satisfactoq' to 
describe the benefit of the charter as the trust property, and w'hat obstacles lie in the 
way of identifying the benefit of the covenant in the conveyance of the trust as the 
subject-Blatter of the trust (see rvloffat, Trllsts Law, pp. 140-1)? 
4 Could it be argued that the De lvlattas v. Gibson principle applied by Lord Shaw 
is the equitable counterpart of the tort of kno,ving interference \vith contractual 
rights? (See Swiss BlIl1k Corp. v. Lloyds Bank Ltd [1979J ell 548; cL 'Covenants, 
Privity of Contract and the Purchaser of Personal Property', pp. 82-3). 
5 Section 34 of the ~/ler(hant Shipping }\(t 1894 provides: 
Except so tar as Inay be necessary for Jllaking a 1110rtgaged ship or share available 
as seclIritr for the 1l1ortgaged debt, the IllortQ.agee shall not bv reason of the 
I L .... ,-' '- ~ 
1110rtgagc be dcelned the owner of the ship or share. nor shall the 1110rtgagor be 
deellled to have ceased to he o\vner thereof. 
Are there any dlles in this provision to suggest that the decision in Lord 
Strl1t/rcOII(l Stc(lIllship Co. V. OlJ1llillioll L~O(11 CO. is correct in the lilllited context 
of l1laritilne itl'v? 
6 \"'hat solutions to the practical issues raised by the case, beyond the confines of 
shipping, are provided under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 199Y? 
Page   352
9,2.2. The recognition of a proprietary right to occupy the rnatrirnonial hOlne 
Under the (0]111110n len\' a \vife has long had <l right to occupy the \nalri.ll1oniaJ 
h()lne' (C;lIfaSZ v. (;111'052 (1970/ P II). This is based upon the lllarriage contract 
and the no\v anachronistic vie\v that a husband is under a nOll-reciprocal duty to 
l11ajntain his \-vife, although it is arguable (but b~' no Ineans established) that, to the 
extent that any such duty still exists under the cornlllon In,,', it should no\\' be 
borne equalJr by both parties to the 111arriage (see the (Olllll1ents of Ewbank J ill 
Han1lllll v. Gle11cross r 19H51 F~lJn 49 at 58B-C). 
The COn1111011 hn\' righL \vas dearly a personal one o\vcd by the hushand to his 
,vife and having no bearing 011 third parties. Thus a third party \\'ho acquired an 
interest frotll the husband did not need to concern bin1 or herself \"ith an~r right of 
occupation o\ved by the vendor to his \vife. However, in a s~ries of cases in the 
1950s and] 960s, the Court of Appeal, under the J\!laster of the Rolls, Lord Denning 
(in response to ne\v social pressures stenll11ing frol11 the increasing incidence of 
Inarriage breakdo\vn), engaged in a process \vhich sought to elevate the personal 
right into a proprietary one br nleans of\\'hat becaJlle kno\vn as the (deserted \\'ire's 
equityl. Under this approach the \vife's personal right i:lgainst her husband \vas 
transforn1ed into an eqllity binding on n105t categories of third party frOlll the 
lTI0111ent he deserted her. As all equity the right, in broad lenns, bound everyone 
\-vith the exception of purchasers \vithollt notice (includ ing constructive notice -
see section 14.3.1 bel(HV) of the eq 1I it)'. As Gray has noted, the cOllsequences of this 
(0111111011 la\v developnlellt ,vere silnply ludicrolls: 
The deserted wife's equity beeallle a nighunare for conveyancers .. , illlposl ing] an 
enlbarrassing onus of enquiry on any third party entering into any transaction (e.g. 
sale, lease or lllortgage) with a In<111 whose household included a resident adult felnale, 
In order to be safe frolll adverse ciainls to occupy. the purchaser had to inquire. tll'st. 
whether that WOlnan was the wife of the vendor/lessnr!tnortgagor and. secolld, (_ L 
\vhether the 111arriage (if there was one) was happr and stable. {Gray. Elel1lents or 
L,"leI Lel \\' (2nd edn), p. 159) 
According proprietary status to the deserted \"ife' s right to occupy lacked the 
certainty and ease of identification necessar\' to enable the cOI1\'erancing svstClll to 
, " ,-, 
\vork efTiciently. \Vhile it is not 1l1l(01l11l10n for 1110rc than one party to hi.n'c a right 
to occupy land (by reason of their contributions to the purchase price or arising 
under sllch doctrines as constrllctive trust and proprietary estoppel) interests 
arising in such it lllanner are not as susceptible to the sanlt' criticislllS I ~llthollgh 
the)' are hardly inll11Une - see Lvlolhlt, Tnf5ts Low). The deserted wife's equity, 
ho,,,ever, st retched the boulld,l ries of p ropen ~- too far. and, ill lVa t iOl1ol Pnll'i IIC;(I/ 
Balik v. Aillsworth I) 965] AC 1175, the HOllse of I.ords heralded ,I return to 
orthodoxy by roundly re,;elting Lord Denning's her('s~'. 
Although ,iustified, the conservati,"c nat lire of their Lord~hips' (lpproach d(:'arl~· 
failed to address the social issues which had caused I hc ( ~()llrt or Appeal to adopt 
sllch a radical stance in the first pJace. Lord \V ilber'l'(') rlC, IHlWC\'Cr, \\'\1!-. adalnant 
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that (,,,,hile SOIlle of the problenls nlight be alleviated) it "vas ultinlately not the role 
of the courts to solve society's ills in this \va)': 
The deserted wife therefore, in Ill)' opinion, cannot resist a dainl fr0l11 a 'purchaser' 
fr0l11 her husband whether the (purchase' takes place after or before the desertion. 
As regards transactions 5ubscquent to the desertion this disability is sOJllewhat Initi-
gated b)' three t~lCtors. First, if it appears that the husband is threatening to dispose of 
the hOllse in sllch a l11anner as to defeat her rights, she 1l1LlY be able to obtain an 
in.iunction to restrain hinl frol11 doing so ... Secondly, the COllrts have anlple po\vers 
to detect, and to refuse to give effect to, shaIn or fraudulent transactions .. , Thirdly, 
there are S01l1e extensive powe"rs conferred by statute (rvlatrinl0niaJ Causes 
(Property and Ivlaintenance) Act 1958 [see now section 37 of the tvlatriInonial 
Causes Act 19731) to set aside dispositions ainled at defeating the wife's right to 
Inaintenancc ... As rcgnrds those cases ((lllri I recognise thnt the), lUll), exist) which fall 
olltside, the deserted wife 111n)' be left 1lllprotected - she nUl)' lose her h07lle. As to thelll, it 
was said b)' Uoxbllrgh J ;11 Chlll'ciJer 1'. Street [1959/ ell 251,258: (It would Iwve been an 
ndWUltllge, ill 111)' l'iclV, ~r Pa r/itJ 11 lCII t, father thnl1 n higher COllrt, had inte1vel1ed, bect1use 
in order to prel'elll certai1l cnses of injustice to deserted wives, a position has been brought 
about which may produce considerable i"justice to other people ... ' I respec~/ltlly agree 
with this state/llellt. (1\!lltioIW/ PrOl'iIlCil1/ Bank v. Ainsworth ( 1965] AC 1175 at 1258-9, 
enlphasis added) 
" 
vVithin t\yO years Parlimnent had responded to this call by introducing a 
statutory scheine no\v contained il1 sections 30-31 of the Falnily La\v Act 1996. 
Under the schenle both spouses have a personal right to occupy the fall1ily hotne 
\vhich they Illight turn into a property right binding on third parties by registering 
that right in the land register (specifically, by entry of a notice: see section 15.2.4.3 
belo\v). vVe ,vill deal ,vith ho\v the schelne ,vorks in Notes and Questions 9.2 belo\v 
,,,,hen \ve consider \vby statute, rather than the C0I11111011 hay, \vas better able to deal 
\vith this particular issue. Uitilllately, IHHvever, the spouse's statutory right to 
occupy the Inatrilll0nial hOlne should be seen as a Ile\v type of property interest 
created by the legislature in response to social change and pressure. 
Notes and Questions 9.2 
Consider the follo\-ving notes and questions both before and after reading the 
extract frolll NativlUll Prol-'iJlcia/ Balik v. Ainsworth [ 19651 AC 1175 belo,v (a longer 
versioll l along \vith further l1laterials, is also available at \V\v\v.can1bridge.org/ 
propertylaw/) . 
v"hat type of property interest \vas the deserted wife's equity and vvhat \vere the 
consequences of this categorisation? 
"') If lVlrs Ainsworth had \von the case in the House of Lords, and it had been held that 
all ,vives did have such a right of occupation, and that it wns a property interest: 
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(a) Would husbands have had the saine right as wives? \Vould 1I1lJnarried couples living 
together as husband and wife h"lVe been in the Sall1e position as IHarried couples? 
(h) vVhen would a ,vite's right have arisen as against her husbanJ, and when would it 
have arisen as against third parties? \'Vhy was this distinct ion Inade? 
(c) \,yhen would the wite's right end? 
(d) If a purchaser wnnted to buy a hOllse frol11 ;l nlan who appeared to be the sole 
holder of the fee sinlple absolute in possession of the land, how could the 
purchaser tlnd nut whether or not the Inan had a wife who (}"illled this right of 
occupation? \Vhat would have happened if. after cOlnpkting the purchase. he 
djscovered for the first titne that lhere I\,(l~ a wife and she did have such a right? 
3 Why \vas Lord \Vilberforce convinced that the deserted ,-vile's equity should not 
be a property right and "'hat \vere the \veaknesses he identifies in Lord 
Denning's short-lived creation? 
4 Is -there a degree of circularity in Lord 'Vilberforce's analrsis? 
5 \Vhat \vas the solution of the legislature under sections 30-31 of the Falnily L~nv 
Act 1996? Is the right granted under the Act a personal or a proprietary right, 
and \-vhy is that an unfair question? "Vhat is the effect of section 31 ( 1 0), and \\rhy 
is there an alternative Inechanislll under section 31 ( 12)? 
6 Which \,vas the better solution - the one developed by Denning's Court of 
Appeal or the one created by the legislature in the ,vake of i\!atiOll11I Prol,illcia/ 
Blll1k v. Aillsworth? 
7 Is the history of the deserted ",ife's equity a Glutionary tale denl0nstrating the 
folly of judicialla\v-tnaking or an exanlple of ho\" illlportant it is to have a 
proactive Court of Appeal \·villing and able to challenge orthodoxy and the 
prevailing legal consensus? 
Extract 9.1 Ntltiollal Prol';ucial Balik \'. AillslVortl, (1965} AC ] 175 at ] 247-8 
The position, then t at the present tinIe, is this. The wife has no specific right against her 
husband to be provided with any particular hOllS~, nor to rCJllaill in ,any particular 
house. She has .. 1 right to cohabitation and support but. in (ollsidering whether the 
husbClno should be given possession (.If property of his, the court will ha\'c regard to the 
duty of the spollses to each other. and the decision it reaches will be based Oil a 
consideration of what Illtly be called the Illatrirnonial circunlstances. These include 
such Inatters as whether the husband can provide ~\lterni.lti\·(.' accollllllodatioll and, if 
so, whether such i.lccolnnlodation is suitable having re~ard to tht' estate and condition 
" '-
of the spouses; whether the h llsha nd' s conti lIct ,11110UlltS to desertion, whether the 
cunduct of the wite has heen such as to depri\"C her of all~' of her rights agi.linst lht' 
husband. The order to be nlade nlllst be f"~lshiolled i.lccordin~h': it l111l\' be that tht' wit<.--
'-,. . . 
should leave illlnlediately or after a certain period: it nla~- be ~uhject tn re,-isioll Oil a 
change of LirCUll1stllllces. 
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j~b ~ropeny LdVV 
The conclusion elnerges to IHy IHind very dearly fr0l11 this that the wile's rights, 
as regards till' occupation of her hushand's property, are essentic.llly of ,1 personal 
kind: personal in the sense that a decision (an only be reached on the basis of considera-
tions essentiall), dependent on the tnutual c1aill1S of husband and wife as spouses and as 
the result of a broad weighing of cirClllllstanct's and Illerit. Nloreover, these rights are at 
no tinle definitivcJ they are provisional and sub.icct to review at any titne according as 
changes take place in the lllaterial cirCUlnstances and condl1ct of the p<lrlies. 
On any division, then, which is to be lllade between property rights on the one hand, 
and personal rights on the other hand, howcver broad or pel1llJllbral the separating band 
between these two kinds of rights 111ay be, there can be little doubt \vhere the wife's rights 
fall. Before a right or an interest can be adtnitted into the category of propert1" or of a 
right affecting property, it must be definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its 
nature of aSSlllnption by third partiesJ and have sotne degree of penl1anence or stability. 
The wife's right has none of these qualities, it is characterised by the reverse of thenl. 
9.3. The general reluctance to recognise new property rights 
In deference to the dangers inherent in recognising ne\v interests in property, both 
the restrictive covenant and the spollsal right to occupy, considered in the previous 
section, have, in respect of their proprietary quality, both~e~n heavily CirCUI11-
scribed in an attel11pt to overCOlne sllch difficulties. The restrictive covenant is 
linlited to land (and possibly ships) and bound by stringent rules relating to 
the transnlission of both its benefit and burden; ,,,,hile the spousa] right to occupy 
the Inatrilllonial honle only acquires a proprietull' status once notice is given to the 
wq..r1d via statutory registration procedures. 
Despite the excesses of Lord Denning's Court of Appeal during the history of the 
short-lived (deserted \\Tite's equity" the hnv's usual approach in this area is rather 
lllore cautious displaying a deep-seated reluctance to elnbrace too readily nevy 
property interests. \Ve have already seen, in Hill v. Tupper (Extract 5.1 above), one 
exalnple of the court's refusal to recognise a novel property right. In this section, \ve 
,,,ill concentrate on another case, \lictorin Pnrk Rl1(illg v. Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479 
(Extract 9.2 below) in vvhich, despite cOlnpelJing argtll11ents to the contrary, the 
Australian I-ligh Court declined all invitation to recognise ,vhat \vould in effect have 
been (froIll sOlne perspectives at least) a proprietary right to a vie\\'. 
9.3.1. The facts of Victoria Park Racing v. Tay/or 
The case involved a dispute between t\vo neighbours. Victoria Park Racing lnvlled 
a racecourse known as Victoria Park at \vhich they held regular horse race Ineetings 
to \vhich the public were charged an adnlission ret' to attend. ·raylur o\vned a plot 
or land adjoining the racecourse 011 \vhich he built a platfonll overlooking the 
racecourse and frolH where he alknved a C0l11111entator called Angles to broadcast 
live cOlnnH?J1taries on the races. According to Lathan, CJ, Angles ,(iescriber d I the 
races in a particularly vivid 1l1anner', Llnd the racecourse o\vners sought an 
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injunction preventing hilll fr0l11 broadcasting fronl his vantage point as, in their 
view, the live C0111111entaries \vere having ;.1 deleterious effect 011 the IHlIllher of 
people paying to attend the race 1l1eetings. But the High Court of Australia. by ,1 
111aJorit), of three to t\"O, confirnled the decision or the judge at tirst instance, 
Nicholas L and refused the in,i unction sought. 
9.3.2, The views of the rnajority 
The approach of the 1l1a.jority in Victoria Park J?llcillg v. 1'(1,1'/01' is characterised by 
extrelne Judicial caution, even conservatislll, in ,vhieh 111uch is Inade of the lack of 
judicial authority for the arglllnents raised by the racecourse o\vners. The (ourt, in 
the \vords of Lathanl CJ, \\ras (not ... referred to any iluthori t" in English h\\v 
, I L 
\vhich supports the general contention that, if a person chooses to orgnnise an 
entertainlnent ... he has a right to obtain frolll court an order that I a third party] 
shall not describe ... \vhat they see'. And Sill1ilarly that <[n]o authority has been 
cited to support ... (the] proposition' that lSllch description is \vrongfuI'. I n a 
sitnilar fashion, Dixon J stated that the interest Victoria Park Racing sought to 
..... ~ 
protect ,vas 'not an interest falling \vithin any (~ltegory \vhich is protected at I<.l\\' or 
in equity'. \"'hile ivlcTiernan J \vent even further d()\-\'Il this route in (arguably 
incorrectly) stating that 'there are no legal principles (as opposed to authorities! 
which the court can apply to protect the [racecourse owners r. 
Such statelnents should be contrasted \vith the approach evident in TIIlk v. 
Moxhtl)' and Hill v. Tlipper, ,,,here the iudgll1ents all proceed on the basis that the 
court can and ,,,ill recognise ne\\T rights \vhere there are c0l11pelling reasons so to 
do. In contrast, the 111aiority in \l;ctoria Pllrk RIlCitH:!: v. TCll'/or seenl to base their 
• , c.... ~ 
decision on the sinlple t~lct that the right claitned \\Touid be a novel one and nlust 
therefore fail, irrespective of the econolnic or social grounds for recognising it. 
.... .... ~ 
There are, \"e \vould suggest, po\verful reasons tCJr agreeing \vith the Illa.iority 
decision in the case, \"hi(h \-ve \vil1 canvass belo\\r. I-ItHvever, in choosing to 
.... 
concentrate on a (self-perpetuating) lack of previolls authority, slIch arguI11cnts 
are left unheard. 
9.3.3. The views of the rninority 
Rather than arguing directly for the propoSItIon that it is possible to 0\\,11 a 
spectacle, the l11inority in the case approached the I1latter 1110re obliqudr, pri111,U-
ily fr0l11 the perspective of nuisance. \Vhile suggesting, in the \vords of Evatt 1. that 
the broadcasters \vere acting in an 'unreasonahle " 'grotesque' ;'lnd \iishonest' \va~' 
and endeavoll ring lo 'rea n where t he\' had not so\\~n', the j udglllcn ts cOlleen l rate ~ t, ~ 
on the issue of the nuisance caused to the racecourse O'\'l1ers Ln' the ilctivitics or 
Taylor and Angles. Thus, according ttl Rich I. because' I a} Inan has no absolute 
right '\",it11ill the ~lJl1bit of his o\,fn land" to ;,lCt ilS he pIC.1SCS', the court \\';.lS quilt' 
justitied in issuing an injunction to prevent the unreasonahle actj"ities 1I1l<..lerttlken 
b\' Tavlor 011 the adioining land frolH il1terferin~ \\'ith the 'usual, rc,lson;'lble and 
I , L I. 
proHtable' llse that the racecourse oWllers were Inaking ortheir land. 
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It is understandable that, ill holding Taylor liable for his actions, the 111inority 
should concentrate on the specific cause of action under \vhich that liability arose. 
However, inlplicit in their reasoning is an assuJllption about the rights that should 
be protecled under the hnv of nuisance \,yhich \vould have represented a Illarked 
departure for the hnv (see section 9.5.2 belo\,y). Traditionally, the courts have 
refused to recognise a general property right to ,1 vie\" (see HUllter v. Callary 
\'Vlullf disclIssed in section 6.4.1.2 above), yet neither Rich J nor Evatt J ackno\vl-
edged ho\v radical \-vas the departure they \vere in effect advocating. That is, of 
course, not to say that such a developlnent \vould necessaril)' have been \vrong, but 
rather that it \vas necessary to explicitly consider the underlying issues prior to 
enlbarking upon such a path. 
9.3.4. The significance of the case 
vVh)', YOll Inight ask, have vve given such prolninence to an Australian case of no 
Inore than persuasive authority in the English courts? Despite its relative obscurity, 
the case is, as Gray has noted (Gray, tproperty in Thin Air), pp. 266-7), a <pivotar 
one which 'reverberates \vith a significance \vhich has outlived its particular facts' 
because tthe contlict bet\veen the lnajority and Ininority vie\vs in this case thro\vs 
up critical clues to the identifIcation of the propertincS5 of property'. 
The case is, like Tlilk v. lV/oxhn)', a product of its tin1e. As E"att J noted C (t) he fact 
that there is no previous English decision \vhich is cOlnparable to the present does 
not tell against the plaintiff because ... sinlultaneous broadcasting ... [and] 
television [are 1 quite ne\v' (\'ictoria Park Racing v. Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479 at 
519) It \vas consequently necessary to Inap out the lilnits of property in the face of 
such technological advances, and it is ilnportant to assess ho\v ,veil the case resolves 
these issues. For, despite Evatt J's observation, it is arguable that the .iudgnlents in 
general fail to rise to the challenge. 
Thus in their various \\Tays the three 111ajority judgnlents all lay elnphasis 011 the 
lack of previous authority tor the propositions advocated on behalf of the race-
course owners. But this is inappropriate \"hen the court is asked to address ho\" the 
COll11110n !tnv should respond to technological advances \vhich pose challenges not 
confronted in the past. Thus. rather than concentrate on the absence of authority, 
the judgnlcnts \vould have better achieved their purpose by considering the 
potential probJell1S froll1 recognising \vhat \vas in effect, property in a vie\-". For 
the la\\r's historic reluctance to do so is based upon the very real difficulties that 
\vould necessarily arise in practice. The recognition of a genernl property right to a 
vie,v would place undue restrictions un the developlnent of land \\Thich are Sill1ply 
not sustainable in a l110dern society and \vhich can Illore efficiently be perforn1ed 
by public rather than private lllech,lnis111S such as planning liny (see Hunter 
v. Cllllary \V/Ul1f discussed in section 6.4.1.2 above). 
In spite of their apparent radicalis111, the t\·\~O 111inority .;udglnents Ina), be 
silnilarly criticised. Rather than confront the practical difficulties that ,vollid 
arise in extending the law of nuisance in the \vay that they envisage, both 
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judglnents place their greatest el11phasis 011 the justice of the racecourse (HVllerS' 
case. Yet this \vas not in dispute, and to elevate it in this 'va)"' silnply t~llls into the 
<hard cases Illaking bad la,v' trap that judges, above all others, should know to 
avoid. Thus the language of I11isappropriatioll llsed by both Evatt J (\\'110 as \\'c have 
seen castigated the defendant for seeking 'to reap \vhere it had not so\vn ': Victoritl 
Park Racing v. Taylor (1937) 5R CLR 479 at 5l4) and Rich J (\vho spoke of the 
defendant 'appropriating ", part of the profitable enjo~TJllcnt of the plaintiffs 
land to his 0\\'11 c0111Jnercial ends': ibid., p. 50 J ) sinlply Illisses the point of the 
endeavour. For ,,,,hile no one sought to argue that \vhat Tay')or and Angles did \vas 
1l1orally correct that did not 111ake it necessarily unhnvful. 
The value of the case consequently lies nlore in ,,,hat it does not sa~' I hall ill \vhat 
it actually does. This is ,,,,hat Gray \vas referring to \vhen he talked about the 'clues' 
the case otfers. But \ve should avoid being too critical at this ,juncture. In TlIlk v. 
l\11oxhc.1)', for exalnple, despite our earlier plaudits, it \vould be an exaggeration to 
suggest that the court directly conti'onted the issues ,,,hen \VelcOllling another 
interest into the property fold. By concentrating on the conscience of the ne\", 
owner of the burdened land, the court in 1l1Jny respects did Illuch to obscure the 
proprietary quality of the interest they had thereby recognised. That only elnerged 
gradually in subsequent cases. This is the reason \\'hy it \vas at that stage, rather 
than at the outset, that the restrictions noted earlier \"ere introduced to lilnit the 
dangers that 11light othenvise arise ti'Olll this upstart ne\y property right. 
Occasionally, of course, the issues are confronted directly, as in l-iill v. Tllpper 
and Natiollal PrOl'il1cia/ Bt1l1k v. Ainsworth, but often the l11<ltter adopts the role of 
Banquo '5 ghost: present but unseen by all but the audience \"atching frolll afar. 
Notes and Questions 9,3 
Consider the follolving notes and questions both before and after reading the extracts 
~ ~ 
fi'oIn Victoria Park Racillg v. TO,dol' ( 1937) 58 CLR 479 belo\\' (a longer \'ersiol1, 
along \\Tith further 111ateriClls, is also \l\'ailable at \\'\\'w.caillbridge.org/propertyla\vl l. 
\"'hat consequences \vould a contrary decision in Fictorio Pill'/.:. Roci1lg \'. Tll,dor 
have produced? No 111atter what the cause of action, \vould a cOl1trar~' finding 
have in effect established property in a spectacle? 
2 Ho\" unfair ,vere the actions of Angles and Ta\'lor? \Vas the court s'"a ,'ed br the 
~, , , 
fortn of cOlllpetition provided by An~des? I-J()\\" \vould Locke have vic\\'ed the 
dispute? 
3 Is ~l lnicrophone 1110re akin to <1 quill than a Gllllcra? \Vould it ha\'(' been 
different if the defendant had shot a vidco rathcr thall hroadcast a \"oice? 
4 vVould an analysis rooted in public polic)' rather than legal precedent 1."Iro\'ide i.l 
difTerellt outconlt'? To \\That extent do theiudgJlll'nts elllhrace not iOlls or public 
policy and \vhat does this say about the role ofcasc law? Stripped of tile rheloric 
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of hnv, is legal discourse on property ever anything Inore than a debate 011 
different perceptions of the general good? 
5 What is the significance of the (ontlict bet\veen the 111ajority and Jninority views 
in the case (See C;ray, <Property in Thin Air'.) 
6 Is there a difference in the .judicial techniques llsed by Lathanl CJ and Dixon J 
as cOlllpared to those of Rich and Evatt JJ? Arc there any parallels to the 
contrasting approaches of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords in Natio1lal 
Prol,j Ilcial Bank v. Ai IIsworth? 
7 In Libling, <The <-=ollcept of Property', David Libling argued that English.la\\f 
ought to adopt the following principle: 
Any expenditure of Inental or physical effort, as the result of which there is created 
an entity, whether tangible ur intangible, vests in ·the person who brought the entity 
i Ilto being, ,~ proprietary right to the COIllll1ercial exploitat ion of that entity, which 
right is separate and independent fron1 the ownership of that entity. 
Do you agree? vVould it (ause any practical problellls? If the judges in \f;ctoria 
Park Uadl1g v. Taylor had adopted this as a correct statenlent of la"", ""ould the 
decision of the court have been different? 
, 
Extract 9.2 Victoria Park R(lcing v. Taylo,. (1937) 58 CLR 479 
LATHAlvl CJ: This is an appeal fronl a Judgl1lent for the defendants given by Nicholas J 
in an action by the Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co. Ltd against 
Taylor and others ... 
The plaintiff cOll1pany carries on the business of racing upon a racecourse kno\.yn 
as Victoria Park. The defendant Taylor is the o\vner of the land near the racecourse. He 
has placed an elevated platfonn on his land ti'Olll \",hich it is possible to see what takes 
place on the racecourse and to read the inforn1ation which appears 011 notice boards 
on the course as to the starters, scratchings, etc., and the winners of the races. The 
defendant Angles stands 011 the platfonn c.lnd through a telephone conllnellts upon 
and describes the races in a particularly vivid 1l1anner and announces the naInes of the 
\vinning horse. The defendant, the COllll110nwealth Broadctlsting Corporation, holds a 
broadcasting licence under the regulations l1lade under the vVireless Telegraphy Act 
1905-1936 and carries on the business of broadcasting frolll station 2U\V. This station 
broadcasts the (Olnnlentaries and descriptions given by Angles. The plaintiff wants to 
ha\'e the broadcasting stopped because it prevents people froll1 going to the races and 
paring for adtnission. The evidence shows that SOlne people prefer hearing about the 
n\(e~ as seen by Angles to seeing the races for thenlselvcs. The plaintiff contends that 
,L L 
the dan1a O c which it thus suffers gives, in all the CirCltlllstances, ,1 cause of action ... b L 
I anl unahle to see that any right of the plaintiffhas been violated or any wrong done 
to hinl. Any persoll is entitled to look o\'er the plaintiffs fences and to see what goes un 
in the plaintiffs land. If thl' plaintiff desires to prevent this, the plaintitr call erect a 
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higher fence. I~llrther, if the plaintiff desires to prevellt its l1()l ice hoards lX'ing seen hy 
people frolll outside the enclosure. it can place theln in stich Cl position thilt the,' arc 
not visible to such people. At sports grounds ,lnd other places nf cntcrtailllllent it is the 
lawful, natural and C01111110n practice to puL lip fell(c~ and other strudures to prevent 
people who are not prepared to pay t<H adlnissinll frOJll gett illg the benefit of the 
entertainnlent. In Iny opinion, the law cannot b~' an iniunLtioll in cfTcd erect fences 
which the plaintiff is llot prepared to provide. The defendilllt docs no wrong to the 
plaintiff by looking at what takes place on the plaintiffs hlnd. Further, he docs no 
wrong to the plilintiffhy describing to other persons, to as wide an audience as he can 
obtain, what ttlkes place 011 the plaintiffs ground. The court has Ilot been referred to 
any principle of law which prevents any l11all frnlll descrihing anything which he sees 
an}'\vhere if he does not 1l1ake defanlatory St<1tCll1(,l1t5, infringe the law as to olTensi\'e 
Jangunge etc.. break a contract. or wrongfully re\'cal confidential infonnatioll. The 
defendants did not infringe the law in any of these respects ° 0 • 
It has been argued that by the expenditure of Inoney the plnintiff has created a 
spectacle and that it therefore has what is described as a quasi-property in the spectacle 
which the law will protect. The vagueness of this proposition is apparent upon its {<lee. 
'Vhat it really Jueans is that there is SOIl1C principle (apart fnJlll (ontract or (onfldential 
relationship) which prevents people in sOlne CirCUll1stances frolll opening their eres 
and seeing s0l11ething and then describinu what the\' see. The Court has not been ~ '- t'J,
referred to any authority in English hn\' which supports the general contention that. if a 
person chooses to organize an entertailllnent or to do anrthing else which other 
persons are able to see, he has a right to obtain frol11 ;] court an order that they sh"lll 
not describe to anybody what they see. If the dailll depends upon interft">rence with a 
proprietary right it is difficult to see how it can be lllaterial to (ollsider whether the 
interterence is large or sJllall - whether the description is COlllll111ni(ated to nlan~' 
persons by broadcasting or by it newspaper report. or only to ,1 fe\\' persons ill conversa-
tion or correspondence. Further. as I have ah'ead~' said. the 1l1ere fa(t that dalllagt' results 
to a plaintitl fr0l11 such description cannot be relied UPOIl as a GltlSe of action. 
I find diff1culty in attaching any precise llleanillg to the phrase (property ill a 
spectade'. A 'spectacle' cannot be 'owned' in any ordinary sense of that 'H)rJ. En:'·11 if 
there were any legal principle which pre\'enteJ one person frolll gaining 4111 advantage 
for hinlself or causing daillage to another by' describing a spectacle produced h~' thilt 
other person. tht' rights of the latter person could be descriht'd as propert~' olll~' ill a 
Inetaphoric(ll sense. Any appropriateness in the Inetaphor w(lldd depend upon tht' 
existence of the legaJ principle. The principle (annot itself be based upon su(h a Inetaphor. 
Even if. on the other hand, a spectacle could hc si1iJ to t'xiq as a subied-lllatl('r or 
property, it would still be nC(l'SS;'HY. ill order to pnnoidc the plaintiff in this l.~ast.' with II 
renleJy, to show that the descriptioll of SlKh pr{lpcrt~' is wrongful or that SUdl 
description is wrongful whcn it is \\'idrl~' dissl'nlinatl'd. \!u 'lllthoril~· ha~ het'll cited 
to support stich a propositioll .,. 
RICH J Idissentingj: .. , :\ lllan has no absolute right '\,oithill th<.' alllhil ufhis own 
land' to acl as he ple~lSt'S. His right is q Uti Ii tIed iI Jld such of his ;llts ;1:-; in \',HIt- his 
neighbour's property are bw(ul only in so t~tr ,1S thc~' are rC;lsollahk h;tvill!-! rqo.!~lrd to 
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his own cirClllllstances and those of his neighbour. The plaintiffs case 111USt. I alll 
prcpared to concede, rest on what is called nuisance. But it lllllst not be overlooked 
that this nleans no lllore than that he lllust cornplain of SOllle ilnpain11ent of the rights 
flowing (rolll occupation ilnd ownership of land. One of the prinle purposes of 
occupation of land is the pursuit of profitable enterprises for which the exclusion of 
others is necessary either totally or except upon conditions which I1lay include pay-
111cnt. In the present case in virtue of its occupation and ownership, the plaint itT carrics 
on the business of adnlitting to the land for pa)'111ent patrons of racing. There it 
entertains then1 b)' a spectacle, by a cOlnpetition in the c0111parative Inerits of race-
horses, and it attelnpts by all reasonable Ineans to give to those ""hOI11 it adlnits the 
exclusive right of witnessing the spectacle. the con1petition, and of llsing the collated 
inforn1ation in betting while that is possible on its various events. This use of its rights 
as occupier is usual, reasonable and profitable. So J111lCh no one can dispute. If it be 
true that an adjacent owner has an unqualified and absolute right to overlook an 
occupier \vhatever 111<1)' be the enterprise he is carrying on and to lnuke any profitable 
lise to which what he sees can be put, whether in his capacity of adjacent owner or 
otherwise, then to that extent the right of tbe occupier carrying 011 the enterprise Inust 
be 1110dified and treated in law as less extensive and alnple than perhaps is usually 
understood. But can the adjacent owner, by virtue of his occupation and ownership, 
use his land in such an ullusual way as the erection of a platfonn involves, bring 
Illechanical appliances into connection with that llse, i.c. the Ini~rophone and land line 
to the studio, and then by cOInbining regularity of observation with disselnination for 
gain of the infonnation so obtained give the potential patrons tl Inental picture of the 
spectacle, an account of the cOlnpetition between the horses and of the collated 
inforn1i.ltion needed for betting, for all of which they "'Quid othenvise have recourse 
to the racecourse and pay? To adlnit that the adjacent owner 111ay overlook does not 
answer this question atlirnlatively '" 
There can be no right to extend the nonnal use of his land by the adjoining owner 
indefinitely. He tlli.l)' \vithin linlits 111ake fires, create sll10ke and use vibratoll' lllachin-
ery. He 111ay COnSll111e all the water he finds on his land, but he has no absolute right to 
dirty it. Defendnnts' rights are related to plaintiffs' rights and each o\vner's rights 111ay 
be linlited by the rights of the other ... \I\'hat appears to Ine to be the real point in this 
Lase is that the right of \'iew or observation frolll adjacent land has never been held to 
be an absolute and conlplete right of property incident to the occupation of that land 
and exercisable at all hazards not\vithstanding its destructive etfect upon the en.;oy-
Inent of the land overlooked. In the absence of (lny authority to the contrary I hold that 
there is Ll lilnit to this right of overlooking and that the lilnit I1UISt be found in nn 
attel11pt to recollcile the right of free prospect 1'rol11 one piece of land with the right of 
profitable en';0YJ11ent of another '" Indeed, the prospects of television I1lake our 
present deci~i()11 a very illlportant one. and I venture to think that the advance of that 
art 111ay force the courts to recognize thllt protection against the conlpJete exposure of 
the doings of the individualillay be a right indispensable to the en.ioYlllent of life. For 
these reasons I LUll of opinion that the plaintiffs grievance, although of an unpreced-
ented character, falls within the settled principles upon which the action for nuisance 
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depends. Holding this opinion it is UllnccessarT for 1l1e to di~LlIS~ the question of 
copyright raised in the case. 
I think that the appeal should be allowed. 
DIXON J: The foundation of the plaintiff COlllpan~"s case is no douht the Eh:t that 
persons who otherwise would attend race Ineetings sta~" away because they listen to the 
broadcast Illade hy the deiendtlnt Angles frot11 the tower o\'erlooking the COLI rse, 
Beginning with the danlagc thus suffered and with the repetition that Jllay he expected, 
the plaintiff cOlnpany says that, unless a .iustification for causing it exists, the defen-
dants or SOine of thelll 1l1ust be liable, in ,lS l11lH.:h as it is their unauthorized acts that 
inflict the loss. It is said that, to look for a definite category or fornl of action into 
which to fit the plaintiffs cOll1plaint, is to reverse the proper order of thought in the 
present stage of the Jaw's deveJoplnent. In such a case, it is f<)l" the defendants to point 
to the ground upon lvhich the law allows thenl so to interfere with the llOrtllal COllr~e 
of the plaintiffs business as to cause dainage. 
There is in Illy opinion little to be gained by inquiring whether in English law the 
foundation of a delictual liability is unjustifiable dalnage or breach of specific duty. 
The law of tort has fallen into great confusion, bUL in the nl<l i Jl, '\That <lets and 
L 
olnissions result in responsibility and what do not are nlattcrs defined by long-
established rules of law frolll which .judges ought not \\rittingly to deptHt and no 
light is shed upon a given case by large generalizations about thenl. \Ve know that, if 
upon stich tacts as the present the plaintiff could recover at C01111l1on law, his cause of 
action Inust have its source in an action upon the case and that. in such an action, 
speaking generally, daillage wns the gist of the action, There is perhaps nothing wrong 
either historically or analytically in regarding an action for danlage suffered by words, 
by deceit or by negligence as founded upon the dalllage and treating the ull.justifiable 
conduct of the defendant who caused it as (a] lllatter of ind ucelnen 1. But, whether his 
conduct he so described or be called lllore Silllply a wrongfl11 <lct or Oll1issiol1, it 
relnains true that it lnust answer a known description, or, in other words, respond to 
the tests of criteria laid down by establishing principle, 
The plaintiffs counsel relied in the first instance UPOll an action 011 the case in the 
nature of nuisance. The prelnises of the plaintiff are occupied hy it for the purpose of a 
racecourse. Thev have the natural advantage of not being nverlonked t-H' anv surround-
I '- '- • • 
ing heights or raised grollnd .. , They have been furnished with all the equiptnent Of;,l 
racecourse and so enclosed as to pre\'ent anr lllltluthori7cd ingress or, unless hy SOJlle 
such exceptional devices as the defendants have adopted. all~' 1I1l<111 thori7.ed vicw of the 
spectacle. The plaintiffcan thus exclude the public who do not pa~' and Lan exclude rheIl1 
not only frOI11 the presence at, hut also (i'onl knowledge of. the proccetii ngs upon the 
course. It is upon the ability to do this that the protttable character of lhe enterprise 
ultiInately depends. The position of and the inlprO\'elllt'nts to the land thus lit it for it 
racecourse and give its OCCllP«ltioll a pcll'ticular ,'aillc. The delt'lldalll~, "hell proceed by 
an ulluslIaluse or their prclllises to deprive the plai ntiff s lalld nf this ,'allll', t () strip it () f 
its exclusiveness. By the tower placed where the fact' will he fllll~" visible, lInd eqll ipf"led 
with Inicrophone and line, the~' enable Angles to see the spcctadt' ~'l1d c.:onvey its 
substance by broadcast. Tilt' effect is, the plaintiff sa~'s,illst cIS if the~' supplied thl' 
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plaintiffs Cllstoll1erS with elevated vantage points round the course froln which they 
could witness all that otherwise woulJ attract rheIn and induce thenl to pay the price of 
adlllissiol1lo the course. The feature in which the plaintiff Hllds the wrong of Iluisance is 
the inlpainnent or deprivation of the advantages possessed by the plaintiffs land as a 
racecourse b~7 Illeans of a nOll-natural and unusual use of the defendant's land. 
This treatlllcnt of the case will not r think hold water. It IlHl}' be conceded that 
interferences of a physiLall1tlture, as by hunt's, sll1ell and noise) <lre not the onl}' I1lcans 
of c0l11lnitting a private nuisance. But the essence of the wrong is the Jerraction fronl 
the occupier's en.io)'lnent of the natural rights belonging to, or in the case of easelnents 
of the acquired rights annexed to, the occupation of land. The la\\' fixes those rights. 
Diversion of (listOlll frolll a business carried on upon the land 11l11Y be brought about 
by noise. fUllles, obstruction of the frontage or any other interference with the 
enjoY111cnt of recognized rights arising [roln the occupation of property and, if so, it 
te.)nllS a legitin1ate head of danlage recoverable for the ,vrong; but it is not the wrong 
itself. The existence or the use of a Inicrophone upon neighbouring land is, of course, 
no Iluisance. If one who could not see the spectacle took upon hilllself to broadcast a 
flctitiolls account of the races he tnight conceivably render hilllSelf liable in a forlll of 
action in which his hllsehood played tl part, but he would COlllnlit no nuisance. It is the 
obtaining a vie,v of the prelnises which is the foundatioll of the allegation. But English 
law is, rightly or wrongly, clear that the natural rights of an occupier do not include 
freecioJ11 frol11 the view and inspection of neighbouring occup~rs and of other persons 
who enable thell1Selves to overlook the prenlises. An occupier of land is at liberty to 
exclude his neighbour's view by any physical 111eans he can adopt. But, while it is no 
wrongful act on his part to block the prospect froln adjacent land, it is no wrongful 
act on the part of any person on such land to avail hinlself of what prospect exists 
or can be obtained. Not only is it lawful on the part of those occupying prelnises in the 
\picinity to overlook the land froln any natural vantage point. but artificial erections 
tnay be 1l1ade which de~troy the privacy existing under natural conditions. In Chal1dler 
v. Tlw,,'psoll (1811) 3 Camp 80 at 82; 170 ER 1312 at 1313, Le Blanc J said that, 
although an action I'e.)!" opening a window to disturb the plaintiffs privacy was to be 
read of in the books, he had never known such an action 111aintained, and when he was 
in the COlnn10ll pleas he had heard it laid down by Eyre LeJ thi.lt such an action did not 
lie and that the only relnedy was to build on the adjoining land opposite to the 
offensive window. After that J,lte, there is, I think, no trace in the authorities of any 
doctrine to the contrary_ 
In JOhllSOIl v. H'Yiltf ( 18(3) 2 De GJ&S 18 at 27: 46 ER 281 at 284, Turner LJ said: 
'Thal the windows of the hOllse 111a), be overlooked, and its cOlnparati"c privacy 
destroyed, (lnd its value thus dilnil1ished by the proposed erection ... are tllatters 
with which, as I apprehend, we have nothing to do " th'lt is, they afford no ground t<'ll· 
all injunction. This principle fornled one of the subsidiary reasons upon which the 
decision of the Holtse of Lords was hased ill Tlip/illg v. fOlies ( 18(5) t 1 H LC 290 at J 17; . 
11 En. 1344 at 1 J53. Lord Chcltnsford said: 
... the oWller of a hOllse has a right at all tinlt'S ... to opellllS 111al1), windows in his 
own hOllse f.l!' he pleases. By the exercise of the right, he Inay Inaterillily interfere 
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with the «Hnforl and enjorlncnt of his neighhour; hut of this specit's of injllr~· lhe 
Jaw takes no cogn iZ<lnce. I t leaves e\'C1Tone to his self-d<?fellcl' a~,l i nst an anll() \'(1 I1(C 
'- ~ ..... 
of the description and the ol1l~! relnedy in tht' power of ad.joining owner is to huild 
on his own ground and so to shut out the offensivc windows. 
When this principle is appl it'd to the pia i nt iff s cast' it Illeans, I t hi Ilk, t ha t the essent i al 
elenlent upon which it depends is lacking. So far as freedolll horn vjew or in!'ped ion is 
a natural or acquired physical char'lderistic of the site, gi"ing it vallie for th<:, purpose 
of the business or pursuit ",h ich t he plain tifl c()llliucts, it is (1 dl41 racleristic wh ich is 
not a legally protected interest. It is not a natural right, for hre.lCh of \\'hich a legal 
reined}, is given, either by an action in the nature or Iluisanct' or otherwise. The bd is 
that the substance of the plaintitfs cOJnplaint goes not to intert~ITl1l'e with its cn,ioy-
Inent of the Janel, but with the profitable conduct of its business. If English law had 
followed the course of de\'eloplnent that has recently taken place in the United States, 
the broadcasting rights in respect of the races lllight have been protected as part or the 
quasi-property created by the enterprise, organisation i.\lH.1 labour of the plaintiff ill 
establishing and equipping a racecourse and doing all that is necessary to conduct race 
nleetings. But courts of equity have not in Britishiurisdictiolls thrown the protC'dion 
of an injunction around all the intangible elell1ents of value, that is \'alue in exchange, 
which nlay flow frolll the exercise by an individual of his powers or resources whether 
in the organization of a business or undertaking or the use of ingenuity, knowledge, 
skill or labour. This is sufficiently evidenced by the history of the law of copyright, 
and the fact that exclusive rights to invention, trade Inarks, designs, trade nallle ,lnd 
reputation are dealt with in English law as special heads of protected interests and Ilot 
under a wider generalization ... 
In dissenting frolH a judgnlent of the Suprenle Court of the United States, by \\~hich 
the organized collection of news br a news service was held to give it in equity a qUi.lsi-
property protected against appropriation b~· rival news i.lgc?l1cies. Hri.l11<.it'is J ga\'c 
reasons which substantially represent the English view and he supported his opinion 
by a citation of lllllCh English authority: Illtc1"1wtiolltll ~vcw~ Sen'jcc '., .-\s50cil1tcd Press, 
248 US 115 ( 1918), His judgillent appears to Inc to contai nail ~llieqllate answer both 
upon principle and authority to the suggestion that the defendants are Ini~appr()priat­
ing or abstracting sOlnething which the plaintiff has created and alone is entitled to 
turn to value. Brietly, the answer is that it is not heC<lllS(' the indi"idual has hy his 
efforts put hill1self in a position to obl~lin value for what he can give that this right to 
give it becolnes protected hy law and so aSSllllles tht' exL"iusi,'eness llf propert ~., hut 
because the intangihle or incornoreal right he ciainls tllls within a recognized l(\t(,~OIT 
.... t \. L L . 
to which legal or equitahle protcction attaLilt,s ... 
In Iny opinion the right to exclude the defendants frolH hrnad(.lsting a dl'!'cription 
of the occurrences they call see upon the pLlil1tiff~ l,lIld is not given by bw. It i~ nnt 
all interest hilling within allY categ(lr~' whiLh is proteLted ttt It1\\' or in elJllit~·. I ha\"c had 
the advantage of readin~ the jlld~1l1('nt of I{il"il 1 hut I <I III unahle to ITt!ilrd thl' 
I.. .... '- .... 
cOllsidera lions wh ieh 'He there set Oll ( as j list i f~'i ng what I (Ollsid er 'll11(ltll1b not 
sinlply ("0 ;,t Ilt'W ~lpplication of settled l"'Irillcipk hllt to the illtrodlillioll illlo the la\\, 
of new d()~trille ... 
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EV ATT J l dissentingi: .. , Here the plaintiff contends that the defendants are guilt}' 
of the tort of nuisance. It cannot point at once to i:l decisive precedent in its t~lVOUr, but 
the statclnents of general principle in Donoghlle v. Stevenson are equallr applicable to 
the tort of nuisance. A detlnition of the tort of nuisance was attenlpted by Sir Frederick 
Pollock (Indian Civil "V rungs Bill, c. VII, section 55), who said: 
Private nuisance is the using or authorizing the llse of one's propeJt}', or of anything 
under nne's controL so as to injuriously affect an owner or occupier of propelty 
(a) by dilllinishing the value of that property; 
(b) by continuously interfering with his power of control or enjoynlent of that 
property; 
(c) b}' causing Inaterial disturbance or annoyance to hinl in his use or occupation of 
that property. 
\Vhat anl011nts to tnaterial disturbance or annoyance is a question of fact to be 
decided with regard to the character of the neighbourhood, the ordinary habits of 
life and reasonable expectations of persons there dW'elling, and other relevant 
cirCU111stances '" 
At an earlier date, Pollock CB had indicated the danger of too rigid a definition of 
nuisance. He said (BclIllford v. Tllntle)' (1862) 3 B&S 6l\at 79; 122 ER 27 at 31; 
[1861--73] All ER Rep 706 at 710): 
I do not think that the nuisance for \vhich an action will lie is capable of any legal 
definition which will be applicable to all cases and useful in deciding theln. The 
question so entirely depends on the surrounding circuJl1stances - the place where, 
the tinle when, the alleged lluis<ll1Ce, what, the Illode ofcollllnitting it, how, and the 
duration of it, whether telnporary or pennanent ... 
In the present case, the plaintiff relies upon all the surrounding circunlstances. Its 
lise and occllp,ltiol1 of land is interfered with, its business profits are lessened, and the 
value of the land is dilninished or jeopardized by the conduct of the detendants. The 
defendants' operations are conducted to the plaintitfs detrinlent, not casually but 
systeluatically, not tenlporarily but indefinitely; they llSC a suburban bungalow in an 
unreasonable and grotesque nlanner, and do so in the course of a gainful pursuit 
\vhich strikes at the plaintiffs profitable llse of its land, precisely at the point where the 
profit nll1st be earned, nanlely, the entrance gates. Nlany analogies to the defendants' 
operations have heen suggested, but few of thenl are applicable. The newspaper which 
is published a considerable tillle after a race has been run COlllpetes onl)' with other 
newspapers, and can have little or no effect upon the profitable elnploYlnent of the 
plain tiffs land. A photographer overlnuki ng t he course and subsequently publishi ng a 
photograph ill i.l newspaper or elsewhere does not in_iure the plaintiff. Individuals who 
ohserve the raci ng frotH their OWI1 hOllles or those of their (i'iends could not interfere 
with the plaintiff's beneficial u~e of its course. ()n the other hanJ, the defendants' 
operations arc I~lirly cotnparablc with those who, by the eJnploYlllcnt of llloving 
picture fillllS, television and broadcasling, would COllyey to the public generally 
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(i) frol11 a point of vantage specially constructed; (ii) sinlliltane()usl~' with tht: 
actual running of the races; (iii) \'isual, \'erbcll or audihle representations of each and 
every portion of the races. If such a pia 11 of Cal11 pa ign were ptt rsued, it w()uld result ill 
wh(lt has been proved here, n(llneiy, actual pecuniary los~ to the occupier of tht' 
racecourse and a depreciatioll in the value of his land, at le,lst so long as the conduct 
is continued. In principle, sllch a plan 1l1ay be regarded as equivalent to the erectioll by 
a landowner of a special stand outside a cricket ground for t he sole purpose of enabling 
the public to witness the cricket Inatch llt all 'l<.iJnission pric(' which is lower rh,lll that 
charged to the public bodies who own the ground, and at great expense ()rg~lnizl' 
the galne. 
In concluding that, in such cases, no actionable nuisance would be created, the 
defendants insist that the law of England does not recognize any general right of 
privacy. That is true, but it carries the defendants no further. because it is not lllerely an 
interference with privacy which is here relied UpOll. ilnd it is not the hnv that every 
interference with private property [Hust be la\\rful. The defendants also say that the law 
of England does not forbid one person to overlook the property nfanother. That also is 
true in the sense that the fact that one individual possesses the Ineans of watchi ng, and 
sOlnetillles \vatches, what goes on in his nei1!hbollr's land, does not Inake the fonner's 
\.. L' 
action unla\vflli. But it is equally- erroneous to aSSUllle that under no cirClllllstances (.tll 
systelnatic watching alnount to a civil wrong, for an analysis of the cases of J. L)'011S d ... 
S01lS V. H'ilkillS (1899} 1 eh 255, and Hlara Lock C'" Co, Ltd y, Operntit'c PrilltL'1"S 
Ass;stt1llts Societ), ( 1906) 22 TLR 327, indicates that, under sOlne ci rClUllstances. the 
COlnnlon law regards 'watching and besetting' as a nriYate nuisance, although IHl 
.... L t" .... 
trespass to land has been (OllllnitteJ .,' 
In the United States, in the case of lntcnwti011tl/1VCl\'S Sert'icc Y. Associated Press 248 
US 215 at 255 ( 1918), Brandeis J regarded the Ollr Dogs case {Sports 111ld Ccncral Press 
Agellc), Ltd v. Ollr Dogs Publishing Co. Ltd [I Yl61 .2 KB RRO) as illustrating a J.'Irinciple 
that 'news' is not property in the strict sense, and that J per~on who creates an event or 
spectacle does not thereby entitle hinlself to the exciusi\'e right of tlrst publishing th(' 
'news' or photograph of the event or spectacle. But it is an extrCI11e applicatioIl of the 
English cases to say that, because SOllle overlooking is penllissihle, (111 overlooking is 
necessari1y lawfu1. In Iny opinion, the decision in the lnfCflltlt;ol1all\'c1\'s St'lTin' G1Sl' 
evidences an appreciation of the fu net ion of law under Illodern cond i t ions, a Ilel I 
believe that the _iudgillents of the Illa;ority and of Holn1L's J (OlllIllend lhclllsdves as 
expositions of principles which ,1re not alien to English law ,_. 
If I Inay borrow ~onle phrases frolll the nlaiorit~· decisioll, I \yould say that in the 
present case it is indisputahle that the defendant hroadcast i Ilg (OInpany had \'ndea-
voured to reap where it has not sown', and that it has enabled all its listeners to 
appropriate to thelnse)\,es (the harvest of rh()sc who ha\'t' \lot SOWIl'. Here. too, the 
interference with the plaintiff's profitable lise of its land t~lkL's pl,l(f 'prc(ist'l~, at the 
point where the profit is to he reaped. in order to divert a 111att'ri;'11 portion of thL' profit 
frOJll those who have earned it to l hose who have not": 2-t-~ L' S 2 I 5 ~l t 2~ 0 ! Il) I ~ ). For 
here, not only does the hroadcasting C()Jl1F'<lll~· IHake its nWIl husiness profits fi-ol11 its 
broadcasts oftlte plaintiff\ races, it dot'S so, in part at least. h~' L(ln\'L'~'illg to its patrolls 
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and li~teners the benetlt of being present at the ra(eCOllrSe without paynlent. Indeed, 
its expert ,11llHHlllcer see IllS to be incapable of reillenlbering the fact that he is not on 
the plaintiffs course nor broadcasting with its pennission, for, over and over again, he 
suggests that hi~ broadcast is cOining frolll \vithill the (ourse. The fact that here, as in 
the Illlcnllltiollall\fflVs Selv;cc case, the conduct of the defendants cannot be regarded 
as hOI1t'st should not be overlooked if the statelnent of Lord Esher is still true that 'any 
proposition the result of which would be to show that the COllllllon law of England is 
wholly unreasonable and unjust, cannot be part of the C0I11111011 law of EnglalH.f 
(quoted in DOJloghuc v. Stel JellSOI1 [ 1932] AC 562 at 608-9; r 1932) All ER Rep 1 at 25). 
The t~lLt that there is no previous English decision which is cOlnparable to the 
present does not tell against the plaintiff because not only is sinlllltilneOlis broad-
casting or television quite new, but, so t~ll' as I know, no one has, as yet, constructed 
high grandstands outside recognized sports grounds t<)r the purpose of viewing the 
sports and of enriching thclllseives at the expense of the occupier. 
9.4. A comparative confirmation and an economic critique 
This chapter has proceeded on the basis of aSSu111ptions canvassed in section 9.1.2 
above that there is a general reluctance to recognise nelV property interests. This, 
briefly, is because of their capacity to bind third part~s and the (supposed) 
deleterious etfects on alienation that \vould arise by too ready an acceptance of 
novel property rights. Such assull1ptions would appear to be borne out by (0111-
parative experience. As Rudden has noted: 
III all nOI1- feudal systenls with \vhich I anl f~lIniliar (whether earlier, as at ROine, or 
later), the pattern is (in very general ternls) sinlilar: there are less than a dozen sorts of 
property entitlenlent. Three confer possession, either now or later. good against 
strangers: fee (ownership, full or bare), life estate (usufru(t) and lease ... [then 
there are the) non-possessory and non-security rights r ,vhich I] \vill ... give '" 
the Ilalne servitudes .,. {such as] easeillents, profits, restrictive covenants, equitable 
servi tudes, real (ovenants, land obligations ... [and final! y] 
(Rudden. 'EconolniL Theory v. Property Ll'''', pp. 241-2) 
security interests. 
Rudden's purpose is to question \vhether this universal approach to property 
is correct, and he proceeds by considering the legal justifications said to support 
it. 1--Ie bcgin~ by refuting the argllll1ent that there is no delnand for a 1110re 
extensive list of property interests by pointing to the pressures that do (and 
\",ill continue to) exist. Next he considers the dailll that third parties \vill then be 
bOllnd by interests of which they had no notice. \,Vhile ackno\vledgi ng the 
ilnportancc of this issue, Rudden notes it is 111anifestly possible to create regist~rs 
by \"hidl third parties Blight be given notice and that, in any case, the presence of 
notice has ncver been either a necessary or a sufficient ground for granting 
proprietary status in the past. I-Ie then nlOVCS 011 to consider the ob.iection that 
it is wrong to bind third parties by ohligations (particularly positive ones) to 
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which they have not personally consented but refules this. ultilllately, b~' the 
exatl1ple of the lease \vhich already does this within the proprietar~' field. 
Rudden)s t111al substantive argunlcnt is r~iscd against the charge of p)'rtlllJitiillg 
(by \vhich it is c1aiJllcd that land titles will beC0l11e unduly (oI11plictltcd hy the 
lTIultiplying tiers of proprietary interests) that he suggests 111ight he dealt \\Tith h~' 
providing a version of the section R~ procedure under \vhich the L~lI1tts Tribunal 
is enlptnvered to discharge or Inodify ohsoletc restrictive covenants (see Notes 
and Questions 6.12 above). 
Rudden takes an equally robust vic\v of the eCOllOlllic i:lrgulllents typically' 
used to buttress the legal ones. First, he refutes the nl~lrketahility argllJllent by 
suggesting that burdening land \,vith novel interests would not atfect its Inarket-
ability but Silllply its price. He then considers the stan(llrdisation argllnH~I1t in 
which sOlneone \\'ho sells a non-standard product is said to ilnpost' costs Oil 
others because~ frunl then on, eVelYOne has to investig~tc \vhat the\' are buving 
, L J I L 
to see \vhether it is bound by sllch all interest. Ruddell refutes this \vith the 
follo\ving aside: 
'-
First, nowhere does there exist an active wholesale lnarket in ilnnlo\'cables; second, 
every buyer Ina), know today that, as a nlatter of property la\\', he could he bound onl~' 
by certain stereotyped obligations, hut he does not know what t~ln(ies any particular 
seller will seek to exact as a lllatter of contract. 
Rudden continues by \vondering \\'hy, if it is obviolls that in a 111arket eCOIlOlllY 
contractual obligations ,"viII 111ltltiply, the opposite seenlS to occur in respect of 
property interests. After all, he argues, \vhile the inforInatioll (osts in finding out 
about land vvould increase if there \vere a greater nUl11ber of potential property 
interests capable of existing in it, this 'nlay be out \\~eighed ,""hen it (Olnes to 
acquiring' the land by the negotiation costs \"hich \YOldd othenvise be required 
by the seller seeking to inlpose such obligations as i.l Inatter of contract (do ~'OU 
agree?). Rudden is equally distnissive of the land utilisation argulncnt \vhich 
suggests it is ilnportant not to sterilise land by ilnposing positive obligatiolls 
upon it. On the contrary, he rightly contelH.is, positive obligations Inight actually 
augnlent the value of both the dOlninanl and servient tenenlents. The difficulty is, 
of course, that it is hard to qLlantit~7 costs \"i1ich lllight \vell extend well beyond the 
lifetin1e of the (othenvise contracting) origina] part ies. \Vhile ht~ does Ilut addres~ 
that point ,,,hen dealing \vith the land utilisation issue, he does do so in his final 
conllnents on the durahility of property interests. 'Contracts are horn to die', he 
states, \vhile by contrast 'the reiatioJls or propeny are huilt to endure' (Ruddell. 
(~conolnic 'rheory \T. Property L~l\\". p. 254) thus it is consequently 'llore difficult 
to free your land frolll a property burden rather than a contractlltll Ollt'. But 
Rudden is ullcollvinccd, noting Epstein's point ('Nnticc and Frcedolll of 
Contract in the Law of Ser\'itudes', p. 13C-d) that ll1aking ~ln iI11('rl'~t (.1n)~)rit'tar~' 
rather than contractual 'only changes tht' identity of the part~' \\'ho 111 list illiliatt' thl' 
tra I1S<1ctioll' (bu t is not the poi n t tha twit h (on t raLlutl I htl rtf ens there i~ () hell no 
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need for such a tenninating transaction because the burden ""ill die of its o\vn 
accord) vvhile ackno\vledging that, in situations \-vhere the 'property entitlenlents 
and correlative burdens are vvidely dispersed, there \yill be holdout and ti-ee- rider 
diffjcllltie~' (Rudden, 'Ecollolnic Theory v. Property Lc.l\v', p. 259). 
Notes and Questions 9.4 
Consider the foll()\ving notes and questions both before and after reading 
B. Rudden, t Econolnic Theory v. Property La\v: The "NU111erUS Clausus" 
Problenl', in .Eekelaar and Bell (eds.), Oxford Essays ill Jurisprudence: Third Series 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.239. 
Ho\v, if at all, is Rudden '$ arglllnent \veakened by (despite the title of the essay) 
basing all his exanlples on land and at no stage considering the applicability or 
othenvise of 111llCh of \vhat he says to non-land sllch as nloveables? 
2 Does the nornlative vie\v of property rights \ve discuss belo,\' in the next section 
expose Rudden's legal arguluents as little lTIOre than puff? VVhile there 111ight be 
no conceptual reason why \ve cannot enlbrace an ever-increasing list of prop-
erty interests, along \-vith cOITIplicated registration and renl0val schenles, \vhy 
on earth \vould the l11urket \-yant to saddle itself \.vith s~ch burdens? Would the 
lnarket, rather than acadenlics insulated in their ivory to\vers, be ,villing to 
absorb the inevitable increase in both transaction and regulation costs for no 
apparent gain or advantage ,just so as to pander to the \vhinlS of the insane, 
Sill1ple, eccentric and idealistic? 
3 Do you agree \vith Rudden's assertion that burdening land ,vith novel inter-
ests \vould not atfect its lnarketability but sinlply its price? \/'/ould lenders be 
\villing to lend on property \vhere the effect of novel enculnbrances vvas 
not established and \vhich as a consequence held little prospect of ever 
becolning so? 
~ 
4 Is Rudden correct to assert that' no\vhere does there exist an active \vholesale 
lnarket in inlll1oveables'? Do not developlnents \vithin the reaitns of C0l111ner-
cial propert), such as PISCES (\vhere a (On1111011 data standard is being estab-
lished to a11o\\' for the easy translnissioll of real estate data betlveen purchasers, 
vendors ,-lnd their advisers - see \V\v,,,.pisces.co.uk) and REITs (Real Estate 
In\'estlllent Trusts, in which investors \vill be able to invest in a tranche of 
(Olnn1crcial property with sinlilar tlexibility to the \vay in \vhich they 'can 
already invest in portfolios of shares, options and bonds) sho\v that that is 
exactly where the Inarkct is heading? Contrary to Rudden's assertion, REITs ar'e 
in fact already popular in overseas lllarkets including the US, France, Japan and 
Australia, and are likely to be introduced into the UK follo\ving a consultation 
launched by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in lvlarch 2004. 
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5 Is there any substance in Rudden's assertion that uncertainty already exists 
within the Inarket as no purchaser kllo\vS \"hat fancies any particular seller ,viII 
seek to exact as a Illatter of cOlltract'? VVhat \,vouJd the ;'lttitudc of the Inarkel and 
third party advisers such as agents and la\vyers be to a seller \vho repeatedly tried 
to iIllpOSe novel contractual liabilities on prospecti\·c purchaser.s? 
9.5. The future of property 
In the fihn Total Uecnll, Arnold Scll\varzenegger inhabits a planet on \\'hich there is 
a shortage of oxygen and \vhere, as a consequence, property ill air is a valuable and 
alienable cOl1ullodity. In contrast, the earth's atillosphere has until recently been 
conceived of in ternlS of an infinite resource. This is \vhy Cohen, in the Socratic 
dialogue considered in Extract 4.5 above, uses air as an exanlple of sOll1ething to 
which the property label is Silllply inapplicable: 
c: Would YOll agree that air is extreIllely valuabJe to all of us? 
E: Yes, of course. 
C; \"Thy then is there no property in air? 
E: I suppose because there is no scarcity. 
C: Suppose there was no scarcity of any Inaterial ob,iect. 
E: I suppose then there would be 110 property in Inateri(ll oh.iects. 
But this extract is based upon lectures given lllore than half a century ago, and 
Cohen's exanlple has, arguably, not survived enVir01l1nental developJnents to the 
contrary. There are now' EC directives on air quality the effect of \vhich appears to 
give individual citizens propertr rights in air (see Case (~-361 /88, ('0111111 issiol1 (~rth(' 
Europeal1 CO'l1lJ1l1nities v. Federnl Repllblic {~( (]crl1Ulll)' (19911 ECR 1-2567 and 
Case C-59/89, C0I11111issiOll of the Europea11 C0l1l117l1l1itie~ '". Federal Republic (~f 
Cernlnll)", [1991] EeR 1-2607). Silnilarly, in the \\1ake of developlnents such as the 
Kyoto SU111111it on global "rarnling, a Inarket in pollution pennits has been 
established on the Chicago Board of Trade, the effect of\vhich is to turn air quality 
into a tradable resource. As United States govenunent spokeslnen ~\'lelinda Kinlble 
noted, while discussing the eillerging 111arket in sulphur e:lnd carbon dioxide 
pennits, \ve Glll trade anything' (NCl1'5I1ight, BBC2, 28 i\'lay 19<,)8)' b~! \vhich she 
lneans not that everything is property but that anything is capable of being 111ade 
the sub,;eet of property. For, as \ve saw above, property is, fnHl1 one perspective at 
least, Silllply a shorthand Ineans of allocating scarce resources. 
No\"" rOll 111ight, at this juncture. aCCllse llS of begging the qUl'stion. \Vhat. after 
all, is l11eant by a resource? Definitions do, of course, exist. and tend to foclis on the 
sub.;ect-Inatter to \vhich property rights Illight attach: but this !Hisses the point. For 
exanlple, in ,,,hat tod~r seelns little Inure than a parody of the \Yord~ of j\lelindtl 
Killlble) the future Liberal Prinlc fvlinister (generalh~ recognised as the 1l10St 
~ • L 
so(ially liberal and radical l11ainstrran1 politician of his age), \\'. E. (;ladstonc, 
sOlne 200 years earlier lnade h is debut in ParJianlcn t speaking ill !-illppn rt of sl(l\'cr~', 
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the abhorrent and inherently racist notion of individuals o\vning property fights in 
their fellow hUlnan beings. vVhile it is 110\'\' cOll1pletely unacceptable to COll1l110dify 
IHllnan beings in this 'vay, technological advances are (aln10st paraJoxically) 
(all~ing LIS to re-exi.lllline 1110ral arglllllents against cOlll1nodificatioll of the 
l1l111lan body. Thus, in the t~lce of the shortage of organs available for transplantation, 
judicial tHH.l (lCadenlic voices can no\v be heard advocating the recognition of iinlited 
rights of property in nOll-renc\vable body parts (R. v. Kell)' [ 1999 J QB 621 and see 
also the Bristol Royal Infinl1ary Inquiry, /ntcrill7 Report: UeI1101't11 (lnd Retentioll of 
HlIllItlll lv/ateria! (2001) available at \v\v\v.bristol-inquiry.org.uk), <111(1 as \ve briet1y 
noted in Chapter 1, no less cOlllplex issues have to be faced about the \va)' in \vhich \ve 
treat other types of body part, \vhether attached or unattached to the living Or the 
dead (see /\I[oore v. Regents of the University ofC(lI~f()rllia, 51 Cal 3d 120; 793 P 2d 479 
( 1(90), discllssed in Chapter 1). 
Faced with such a praglnatic approach to property, there seenlS little point 
offering a characterisation \vhich seeks to transcend that reality. Franl this perspec-
tive, property is no nlore than a nonnative set of relationships which 11light be 
attached to \vhatever subject-111atter society deenls it necessary or beneficial to Jl1ake 
the subject of propelt)'. \,Ve are sorIl' if that destroys the nlystique but that really is all 
it is. Those \vho seek to otfer a definition that goes beyond this are sin1ply attelnpting 
to Blake property support a philosophical, 1110ral or political burden that it cannot 
bear. NOlA' \'ve Illight ,vell, of course, have vie,""s as to \Vllether or not hUlllan body 
parts should be regarded as property but that is not because \ve have a definition of 
property to \vhich they do or do not correspond but because \ve have certain vieV\'s 
on the efficacy (be that in practical, 1110ra1, ethical or \vhatever tern1s) of lnaking 
thetn subJect to such a reginle. In other ,vords, it is 110t to\vards the defInition of the 
sub)ect-lnatter, but the consequences of the categorisation, that we look, \vhen ,ve 
debate \vhether sOJnething should or should not be regarded as property. Thus 
society Blight in the near future recognise S0l11e fonn of propert), in ill sitll kidneys, 
and \vhether or not it does has nothing to do \vith any detlnitiol1 of property to 
which it 11light subscribe but ,vith the 1110ral and practical consequences of adopting 
sllch a stan,ce. That is not, of course, to deny the legitinlac), of asking sllch questions, 
but Silllply to note they are Inatters to \vbich property alone cannot provide an 
ans\vcr. t:or property is, in short, an essential Inechanisnl for the 'vorkings of any 
society but is separate froln the values that detennine the par~l111eters of\vhat is and is 
not recognised as property \vithin that particular setting. 
Looking to the future 've can but speculate. For exalnple, in both cyberspace and 
outer space, the pressure to recognise He\\' propert), rights is greJ\ving. The J nternet 
has the potentiul to stretch the current boundaries of intellectual property to 
breaking poil1t. In the face of the conten1ptuollS disregard of the rules of copyright 
(and the inability to effectivdy counter such infringeillents), it js at least argu~lble 
that this will have profound l011g-tenn iInplicatiol1s t()r the developtllcnt of 
intellectual property rights in both virtual and perhaps even non-virtual reality. 
I n the realtn of outer space, speculation concerning \valer deposits on the l'vloon 
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has rene\ved interest in the once purely acadelllic question of o\\'nership rights in 
space. There are, it is true, t\\'o international treaties 011 the subject, nalnelYl the 
Outer Space Treaty and the lviooll Treaty, tht' latter of \vhich oUlhnvs propertr 
rights in celestial bodies. I-I()\ve\'er, it is sllrc1y indicati\'c that in the light of 
technological advance the [vloon Treaty has been signed by fe\ver tha n tell coun-
tries of \vhich only Australia has any pretensions in respect of space exploration. 
In the face of such flux \ve \vill end this chapter by considering t\\'O broad 
developtnents in this area, the new property thesis and the eillergence of ,vhat is 
often referred to as quasi-property. 
9.5.1. The new property thesis 
In his article, 'The Ne\v Property', Reich argued that the nc\\' fornls of wealt 11 (such 
as welt~ue benefits) \\'hich had arisen in the \vake of the increased role of go\'erll-
L 
Inent denland the srlllle legal protection as that accorded to private properly. The 
reaSOll for adopting such a strategy 'vas, basically, hvofold. Tacticallr, Reich 
appeared to be trying to entrench 'velf~lre paYlllents by bringing thenl \\Tithin the 
ambit of the constitutional safeguard preventing the deprivation of 'property 
without due process of hl\v', ,vhile, as a polenlic, the article ,vas attelnpting to 
utilise the rhetorical po\ver of private property. 
This has led sonle to question ho\v 'property rights differ frolH rights generally-
frOlTI hllJnan rights or personal rights or rights to life or liberty, say' (Grey, 'The 
Disintegration of Property', p. 71 ). In his vie\", the tenll has becolne so broad as to 
play no useful role in, so to speak, its 0\\'11 right. A silllilar point ,,"as 111ade by 
Ronald Sackville ,,,ho, in rejecting IVlacpherson's attelnpt in lCapitalisI11 and the 
Changing Concept of Property' to redefine the 'concept and institution of prop-
erty" noted that L(b)y expanding the concept of property to the point \"here it is 
all-encol11passing, IVlacpherson rellloves its \'alue as an analytica1 tool' (Sackyille. 
(Propert)' Rights and Social Security', p.250)' Rather than bhlIne l\·lacphersol1, 
ho\vever, Grey points to 1110dern developlnents in the field (or should \ve, in 
deference to hinl, say estale) of property for bringing this about. 
The charge is a serious one and the answer so praglnatic that it lllight disap-
point. For, ,vhile there are obvious dangers in defining a tenll so broadly tll,lt it 
ceases to be of any value absent "'ords oflinlitatiol1, it is sill1ply '\Tong to assert that 
we have, as yet, reached that point in respect of property. At til11es, adJllittedlr. 
SOlne COl1llnentators have f~lll(,11 into this trap. \Vhile (for reasons \\'e will tOllch UJ1 
belo\v) \ve would not b~' this charge at lvla(pherson's door. it is, for l'X~lInple. 
possible to argue that Reich's lYell' Property thesis suffers fronljust Slh:h excess. As 
we have seen, his argtlJllent that Ilew fonns of \vcalth (such as ,,'elfurc p(l~'lllents) 
require the saIne legal protection as that accorded to pri\"atc property is, fr0l11 olle 
perspective at least, Silllply opportunistic. Yet, as it po/elnie seeking to harness the 
rhetorical power or private propertr, the baby .. lppears to ha\"c bC(OlllC slIhlllerged 
beneath the batlnvater. The property pa rallef perf'{)nns no ~lllal:·ti(l/ fll net ion and 
is sinlply \veakent'd by the association. J n contrast. as 'vc sa\\' i.lho\'l'. tlsL'd pr()pcrf~' 
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(\vhich is, after all, at the heart of the tenn' s ontological root) the tenn property is 
silllplya 111eans of sign posting \vhat is (and \vhat is not) regarded as a resource. (See 
Ackennan, Pril'llte Propert), alld the COllstitlltion; Etheleriadis, 'The Analysis of 
Property Rights'; and Waldron, The Right to Private Property.) 
There is indeed a danger in defining propert), so broadly that it ceases to retain 
any real analytical force: but \ve nl11st be careful. Sacl(ville, for exaillple, specifically 
exelnpted Reich fronl this charge \vhen criticising Ivlacpherson's approach on the 
surprising ground that (the phrase «the ne\v property" is not intended to ... be 
regarded analytically as identical to a dainl ... to ownership of goods or an 
interest in land'. In his vie\-v, it \vas possible to use the tenn outside its 110rnlal 
confines provided one did not go as far as Ivlacpherson \vho 'suggests that the 
concept 111tlst be broadened to enlbrace the right not to be excluded frOlll the use or 
benefit of the conl111unity's acclllllulated productive reso urces'. 
But the latitude Sackville extends to Reich is arguably as ill-deserved as the 
criticislll he directs towar~ds lvlacpherson. As Sackville hilllSelf adlnits, Reich's use 
of the terIn takes it outside its analytical fralne of reference: he is silnply attelnpting 
to harness the rhetorical po,ver of private property without engaging in any serious 
attenlpt to analyse the new propert), in such ter01S. But this is exactly what we 
should avoid because it devalues the property label by turning it into little 1110re 
than a political clarion call. In contrast, Ivlacpherson ,,"vas concerned not \vith 
hyperbole but \-vith the far 1110re profound task of re-evaluating the analytical 
definition of property by returning it to its historical roots. III his vie,,,,, <fronl 
Aristotle do\vn to the seventeenth century, property ,vas seen to include ... both 
an individual right to exclude others ti'onl SOine use or enjoYlllent of SOine thing, 
and an individual right not to be excluded frOlTI the use or enjoYlllent of things that 
society had declared to be for COll1111011 use - (0111I110n lands, parks, roads, \vaters'. 
Thus, in describing pensions and the subsidised services of a nl0dern \,velfare state 
in tenns of property, rVIacpherson \vas attenlpting to re-establish an analytical 
concept of propert), that extended beyond the private to elllbrace once Illore the 
con11110ns. 
Notes and Questions 9.5 
Consider the folh.Hving notes and questions both before and after reading Reich, 
'The Ne\\' Property', and the Inaterials highlighted belo\\'. 
Does Reich's use of the property epithet strengthen or \veaken his analysis? 
2 Is the concept of property strengthened or \veakened by its use in such a context? 
3 Despi te its tlll1e (as the nl0st hea vii)' cited article ever published by the ra Ie Llltv 
jVlIrl1(J/), Reidt's thesis has not, as he has hilllseif adlnitted, had a radical effect 
Oil the legal definition of property (l~eich, (Beyond the NC\\T Property: An 
Ecological Vie\\' of Due Process') possibly because it \vas not ultinlately 
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necessary. It is after all perhaps not \"ithollt significance that Reich ,vas able to 
Blake the saine arglllllents <1 fe\", years later in Reich, 'Individual Rights and 
Social Welfare' \vithout at any point using the tCrIll 'propert)". 
4 In \vhat \va)' is rvlacpherson's lise of the tenn (property' in 'Hlllllan Rights as 
Property Rights' different to Reich's approach? Is it a distinction of degree or 
substance? 
5 Macpherson considered that the ditference bet\veen private and C0I11111011 
property \-vas rooted in the concept of exclusion, and contrasted the right to 
exclude that is generally regarded as the halhnark of a private property right \vith 
the right not to be excluded \\Thich he regarded as the key COll1pOnent in COl11-
lllullal property. Does such an analysis suggest Iv(acpherson is l110re or less 
justified than Reich in the \vay in ,vhich he elnploys the tenn 'property' (cf 
Sackville, (Property Rights and Social Security')? 
6 Under the I-IU111an Rights Act 1998, the European Con\'ention on Hlllllan 
Rights \vas incorporated into English tn·\,. Under Article 1 of the First Protocol 
to the Convention, property is protected in the context of possession, ,vhile 
under Article 8 the right to privacy extends to one's hOlne and correspondence. 
Does such an approach equate Inore \vith Reich's or Ivlacpherson's analysis of 
property rights, and ,,,auld either of theln dra\v COlnrort fronl the property 
rights jurisprudence that has elnerged since the Act Glnle into force on 2 
October 2000? (See Rook, <Property La,,, and the Hlllnan Rights Act 1998' and 
Halstead, (I-IU111i1n Property Rights '.) 
7 Do YOll agree \vith Grey, (The Disintegration of Property' I p. 69, \vhen he asserts 
that property rights are often in etfect transitory, and liable (to disappear as if by 
111agic' : 
Yesterday A owned Blackacre; anl0ng his rights of ownership was the legal plH·\,er to 
leave the land idle, even though developing it would bring ill a good inCOllle. Today 
A puts Blackacre in trust, conveying it to B (the trustee) for the benefit of C (the 
beneticiary). Now no one any longer has the legal power to llse the land 
uneconoillically or to leave it idle - that part of the rights of ownership is neither 
in A nor B nor C, but has disappeared. 
Is this really a disappearing rabbit or Silllply a tnHl1/lc-l'oeil? Has the right 
disappeared or just becoille Inore difficult to see? Before Blackacre \vas settled 011 
trust there ,vas no difficulty because as sole o,vner A \\'ould nect'ssarily beal" the 
loss arising fronl leaving the land idle. But introducing a trust into the equation 
necessarily conlplicates Inatters for now o'''l1ership of Bhlckacre is di\'ided 
bet\veen 13 and C and it consequently beconles l1eccssar~? to dctennine on \"hose 
shoulders the loss should hlll if the land is agai 11 left idle. As 1 rllstee, B has the ri gh t 
~ ~ 
to Intlnage the land and ifhe chooses not to do so it Seell1S sensible for the loss to 
fall on his shoulders in the fortn of his liability to C ill hreach of t rllst \"hich, 
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despite the sOll1e\vhat pe,iorativt' tone, is a cOlllpensatory reined), \vhich does not 
seek to punish the trustee (see I-IanbufY and tvlm1in, Allor/ern Eljllit)·, p. (50). 
8 In (Property in Thin Air" Kevin (~ra)' states that '[plropert)' is not then - it is 
fraud ... i:l vacant concept oddly enough like thin air'. The arguillent is 
characteristically provocative and appears to be a staging post en route to his 
latter, lllore ;.llnbitious aUen1pt to 'reconceive the hnv of property' as part of a 
process 'creatinga new C0I11111011\Vealth of dignity and equality' (Gra}', 'Equitable 
Property'). Gray's argulnent is, of course, 111l1ch l110re ct)lnplex than these 
variOllS snapshots can do justice to, but is there, at its core, an irresoluble 
parlldox? Can an argulnent ,,,ith foundations built upon the essential vacuity of 
property reach a condu!)iull that proclainls its central ilnportance? Does Gray 
1l1anage to square the circle in the follo\ving extract, and is it appropriate to 
quote Benthanl at this point in the argtll11ent? 
In the exercise of this dual role the notion of property serves both to (oncretise 
individual lnaterial needs and aspirations and to protect a shared base for 
constructive hunlan interactions. Indeed, in a subtle tninlicry of our thoughts and 
enl0tiol1s, the language of property catches in a peculiarly acute fornl 111any of our 
reactions to the experience of living. The present paper has sought, however, to 
articulate a deep scepticislll about the Ineaning and ternlinology of property. 
Propert), is a ternl of curiously linlited content; as a ~hrase it is consistently the 
subject of na'ive and unthinking use. Propert), cOlllprises, in large part, a category of 
illusory reference: it [01'l11S a conceptual 11lirage which slips e1usi vely fr0l11 sight .i list 
when it seenlS nlost attainabl~' three-dilnensionaL Perhaps I110rC accurately than 
any other legal notion it was property which deserved the Benthcunite epithet, 
'rhetorical nonsense - nonsense upon stilts'. (Gray, 'Property in Thin Air" p. 305) 
9 Could a 111issezI(1ire utilitarian such as Benthalll really hold such vielVS or has he 
been quoted out of context? Is it significant that, \vhen he ,,,rote these ,\vords, 
Benthanl \vas not ridiculing property but the supposed natural right to things 
such as property? 
9,5.2. The emergence of quasi-property 
[11 recent years there has eIllerged \vhat is conltllonly tefIned quasi-propertr \vhich, 
although not property in the absolute l11eaning of the tenn, displays '- frotll certain 
perspectives at least) enough of a proprietary aspect to 111ake the property parallel a 
llseful tool of analysis. ~/l11Ch of \vhat \ve no," regard as intellectual property began 
life as a fOrJn of quasi-property right \\'hich has 510\\'1)' developed into fully Hedged 
propert), interests that can be traded in the 111arketplace. And this is a still devel-
oping process \vith newly established rights such as tHoral rights (which preserves 
<.lll1ong other things the artist '$ right to be identified as the creator of the \\'ork of 
~ L L 
art) occupying a silnilar hinterland. Thus, ,,,hile an artist no\\' has a right, exerci-
sable against third parties, to be identified as author of a \vork, which endures long 
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after he has sold the piece, one cannot silnply use the pr()pert~· right parallel as a 
prenlise fr0I11 \-\'hich to argue that he 1111lst silnilarlr retain ,1 right to he paid on 
subsequent dispositions of the \\'ork (although as test~llllel1t to property's constant 
state of flux there are occasional suggestions, llHlCh to the chagrin of the London 
~L L 
auction hOllses, that just sllch a right to <1 lev)' on future s<lles should be introduced: 
Plvl, Radio 4, 16 Februar}' 20(0). 
The vie\\'s of the nlinoritv in \"ictorill Park [{ocill\.! \'. Tlll'ior Ina\' silllilarh' he seen 
, L " 4 " 
in this light as can the argl.lJllents of those COlll111entators and ,judges ,,,ho h;:l\'e 
sought to broaden the Cllllbit of lluisance by advocating that persons without a 
property interest in the land (sllch as licensees and retat i\'es) should have 10(115 
standi to sue (:hapter (-,). The (ateg(H~' has also been explicitly recognised in the 
United States \vhere the Suprelne Court, in Illtcrllllliollll/l\TCl\'S Se/Ticc \'. A~50(;l1tt..'d 
Press, 248 US 215 (1918)' held that an in,iunction \vould issue to prevent one ne\\'s 
service unfairly c01l1peting \vilh another by copying nc,\'s stories published 011 the 
East Coast of Alnerica for sale to cllstolners on the \Yest Coast. Pitne\' 1 delivering 
" L 
the Inajority vie\v held that a 'quasi-property' in JH~\VS existed to the extent 
necessary to issue an injunction, even though there was no need to consider 'the 
, , L 
general question of property in ne\vs'. Ho\vever, the case is also note-\vorthy for the 
po\verful dissent of Brandeis J: 
[T]he fact that a product of the I1lind has cost its producer IHoney ;.lnd labor. (ind 
has a value for which others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to insure to it this 
legal attribute of property. The general rule of law is that the noblest of 11l1Inan 
productions - knowledge, truths ascertained. conceptions and ioe"s - beCOIl1e after 
voluntary C0111111l111ication to others free as the air! note our earlier COllllnents I to 
(0111111011 use ... Such takings and gainful lIse of i\ product of another which, for 
reasons of public policy, the law has refused to endow with the attributes of property. 
does not beC0111t' lllllawful because the produLt happens to have been t,lken frotn a 
rival and is used in (olnpetition with hin). The llnt~lirnes~ ill cOlnpetitil'Il which 
hitherto has been recognised by the ](\\V as tl basis for relicf ... il1\'()I\'(,~~ fn1l1d or 
force or the doing of ,Kt5 otherwise prohibited b~' la\,'. In the 'passing-off cast's (the 
typical and 1110St CO 1111110 11 case of unfair (olnpctllion) the wrong L'onsists in fraudu-
lently representing by word or act th~\t defendant's goods are those of the plaintiff. 
Yet, although this is correct. it would he <l lllistake to aSSUllle that the pror'ric-
tar), parallel therefore has 110 role to play. Tht' la\\' of 'p,lssing off' dnes protect 
property rights (in at least SOlne senses of the \"ord) c.l~ noted, SOlllc\"hat hesitantl~', 
by Lord Parker in ,4. C;. Sp(lldillg Bros. \'. (;tll1l{/~C l.fd f 1915) R..J LJ eh ~4L) at -l50: 
There appears to he cOllsiderable di\'ersil~' of ()pinit1 1l as to lhe nature of the right. the 
inv.1siol1 of whi(h is tht' suhjel't of what arc knowll ,lS p'\."sill~-ofr actions. Thl' 11HlIT 
general opinion apl,"It'ars lo he I hat the right i~ i.l right of properl ~". This \"it'\\, n'lt lIr;lll~' 
delnands an answcr to the question - pr()pt'rt~· in \\'h~\t? SOll1e i\lIthnritil's";\~·' I'r0J'l'rt\· 
in the Inark, IlClI11t' or get-up illlprOpl'rh- lIsed h~' the d<:fellliallLl )thcl'S S(\~· pr()J't'rt~· ill 
the husincs~ or ~()()d\\'illlikdy to be iniuft'd h~' thl' rnisr~prt'~l'lltati(l11 , ., ! 1/,. the right 
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invaded is a right of property at all there are, I think, strong reasons for preferring the 
latter view , .. l fori cases of Inisrepresentation by the use of a 111ark, nan1e or get-up 
do not exhaust all possible cases of Inisrepresentation. 
The point is accepted less equivocally by Danck\verts J in /. Bollillger v. C;vstn 
Bral/n \-Vines Co. Ltd [1960 J eh 262, 'vvhere he sinlply states that, in passing-off 
actions. the law 'is interfering to protect rights of property'. In recent years, the 
la\v of passing off has arguably gone even further to, in effect, substantively create 
l1e\v rights of property, as 'vvitnessed in Brit ish Telec0l11 v. Olle ill (l lvlil/ioll 
COlJ1111Ul1icatiollS Ltd [1999 j 1 WLR 903, \vhere a I1lllnber of large cOlllpanies 
including Irf, Virgin and fYlarks and Spencer sllccessfully obtained an injunction 
against a C0l11pany \vhich had registered Internet dOlnain l1ClllleS for these and 
other \vell-kno\vn conlpanies in circUlllstanccs where it is extrelnely doubtful 
\·"hether there \vas any real likelihood of passing off actually occurring. 
This seen1S a questionable developnlent. Yet the difficulty is 110t caused by 
the quasi-property label \ve have attached to the right but rather the Court of 
Appeal's reluctance to confront the real issues in the case. Aldolls LJ, who gave 
the only judglllent in the case, proceeds on the basis that British Teleco111 
o\vned the nalne (rather than the trade nlark) 'British Teleco111' and had a 
right to exploit that nalne in any ll1ediunl. Yet, \vhile in the context of an act of 
passing otf the la\v adopts a proprietary approach in lecognising the cOlnpany's 
right not to suffer dclInage to their good naIne, that does not provide a prelnise 
6-0111 \vhich to assert a prope11)' right to their nalne even \vhere there is 110 
likelihood of such dalnage. 
The quasi-property category thus provides a 111eanS by \vhich the subtleties of 
the property hlbel can be appreciated and kept \vithin acceptable bounds as 
can be se,en in the context of confidential inforn1ation ,,,here, for exalnple, 
the property label provides, fronl son1e perspectives, a useful l11eans of analysis 
\vhile in other respects it \vould be deeply tnisleading. As GU1111110\V J stated, \",hen 
considering the proprietary quality of confidential infonnation in Breen v. 
\Villillll1S (1995-6) 186 elR 71 at 129, 'it (is not] acceptable to argue that, 
because in sonle circllll1stances, the restraint of an apprehended or continued 
breach of confidence l11a), involve enjoining third parties ... it folhnvs 
that the plaintiff \vho asserts an obligation of confidence therefore has proprie-
tary rights in the infonnation in question \vhich, in turn found a new species of 
tecTal right'. 1:> L 
Notes and Questions 9.6 
Consider the following notes and questions both before and after reading British 
Tclc(ol1l v. Olle ill tl j\IIillioll (19991 1 \VLR 903 and the Inaterials highlighted beltn\' 
(either in full or a~ extracted at \V\v\v.Ci.llnbridge.org/propertylawl) 
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[s the decision consistent \vith Lord Diplock's judgnlent in E'TCI1 \\'tlnlink 
Bcsoltcll VCllllootschnp v. TOHIII£.'ll(/ d .... SOliS ([-Iu/l) Ltd r I \)7t} I A{: 731 at -; 42~ 
2 Should you be able to o\vn your l1alne in the saIne wa~' in \vhich you 0\\'11 rOllr 
identity or a trade rnark? 
3 Does a high-tech COlllpany such as BT that \\'as intillltltely involved in the 
enlerging Internet sector have anyone but itself lo hlal11e «)r not registering a 
dOll1ain IUl111e before S0111eOne else did? \Vhat \vQuld Locke 11lake of the 
defendant's actions in the case? 
4 Why is it both correct and incorrect to describe contldential infonnatioll as 
property, and \vh)' does sllch an approach aid, rather than obscure, under-
standing (see Kohler and Pahner" [nt(nllltllion as Property')? 
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